Last week’s blog (see Plain Talk, Fuzzy Math) showed how Plains All American (PAA) miscalculates its cost of equity capital. Equity is the key component in a company’s Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC). In the presentation from their investor day, it was too low. We received several comments from readers and investors on the topic. The energy industry has been plagued with executives who value growth in assets over achieving an appropriate Return On Invested Capital (ROIC). Profits come from ensuring that a company’s assets earn a return higher than the cost of financing them, or that ROIC > WACC.

In one meeting with PAA, we asked if they’d considered selling themselves, since there’s a case that the company’s worth more in another’s hands. “Not yet ready to retire” was the answer. Financial discipline comes in many forms.

In too many cases, a CEO’s pay is directly linked to a company’s size. Per share operating metrics and capital efficiency ought to dominate. Management teams often strive for growth, which can conflict with an owner’s desire to earn a good return. Identifying companies where interests are more clearly aligned with investors is worthwhile.

Calculating ROIC for energy infrastructure businesses is tricky. Projects are funded over several years, and project-based returns are generally not disclosed. Therefore, some judgment is required. Wells Fargo made a serious attempt at calculating company-specific ROIC figures last year. A couple of companies (Enterprise Products and Plains) preferred their own methodology over that used by Wells Fargo, and their objections were duly noted in the research report. We explained in last week’s blog why we disagreed with PAA’s approach.

One solution to poor capital allocation decisions is to favor public companies with a significant private equity investor. At first this might seem odd. Private Equity (PE) has delivered mediocre results for investors (see a recent WSJ article, Private-Equity Firms Are Raising Bigger and Bigger Funds. They Often Don’t Deliver). The problem for PE investors is the ubiquitous “2 and 20” fee structure, which is a big drag on returns and has created some fabulous fortunes. However, most PE managers are financially more astute than the typical pipeline company finance department. The best apply rigorous financial analysis, and investing alongside them can be an attractive proposition.

Having a PE partner doesn’t guarantee good judgment, but it does assure that when such decisions are being made, there will be a voice demanding a profitable spread between ROIC versus WACC. Private equity is all about capital efficiency and achieving an attractive IRR. Many energy companies could benefit from greater financial discipline. A few already have such a partner, reflecting the more optimistic outlook PE investors have of the sector compared with public market valuations.

Blackstone and its affiliates own 44% of Tallgrass Energy (TGE). Investors in TGE are in effect co-investing alongside Blackstone, without having to pay Blackstone a fee. It’s appealing to all TGE holders to know that capital allocation decisions require Blackstone’s support.

Crestwood (CEQP) is a similar situation, with their private equity partner First Reserve, who own 25% of CEQP and has also invested in JVs with CEQP on mutually beneficial terms.

Activists can also play a constructive role. In 2016 Carl Icahn pushed Cheniere’s (LNG) CEO Charif Souki out of the company. That’s one solution to the principal-agent problem. Souki is a colorful character (see Coals to Newcastle), but Icahn disagreed with LNG’s investments in oil companies, which were not linked to their core business of exporting liquefied natural gas. In an interview with CNBC, Icahn explained why, and also vented his frustration with Souki’s compensation. The subsequent improved capital allocation and focus on executing their core business plan has seen LNG stock rise from $39 at the time of Icahn’s intervention to $66 today, without paying a dividend.

Enterprise Products Partners (EPD) has a well-regarded reputation for prudent management. Growth projects are funded internally. The Duncan family owns a third of the company and controls EPD, helping align shareholder interests with managements.

Global Infrastructure Partners recently invested in Enlink Midstream (ENLC), and currently owns 41%. Texas Pacific Group and Goldman together own 12% in preferred securities which are convertible into common equity. It’s too early to judge the impact of their ownership, but encouragingly ENLC’s CEO Mike Garberding was previously the CFO. We think it’s highly likely that capital discipline will become apparent at ENLC.

Significant equity ownership by management doesn’t always lead to good decisions. Rich Kinder continued to add to his already significant holding in Kinder Morgan (KMI), even as it lost two thirds of its value from 2015-16. KMI investors could have benefitted from an influential outsider. Energy Transfer (ET) is also heavily owned by management, but trades at a steep valuation discount because CEO Kelcy Warren has shown a willingness to exploit his investors if he can (see Will Energy Transfer Act with Integrity?).

Prior to their simplification, the significant insider ownership at Plains may have led the GP to place too much leverage at the MLP level, leading to unsustainable dividends at the MLP before consolidation. In some cases, management teams whose interests weren’t aligned with investors under the old GP-MLP model have not yet altered their behavior to acknowledge the alignment of interests that simplification brings.

The addition of PE investors makes creating value for all stockholders a higher priority.  This requires disciplined capital allocation.  While Rich Kinder, Kelcy Warren, and the insiders at Plains still own significant stakes, they are holdovers from a different model of wealth creation.  Under their old structure, the GP directed the MLP’s activities while receiving preferential economics through Incentive Distribution Rights (IDRs).  Growing the MLP increased IDRs even if it diluted returns for MLP investors.

Kinder’s simplification was almost five years ago, and yet their continued use of DCF and EBITDA in evaluating their Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) business betrays that they still haven’t updated their thinking. Depleting assets such as these reduce the return earned by equity holders, while the GP and his IDRs are largely immune. As a simplified, single entity KMI still hasn’t shown that it understands its long term ROIC for the EOR business.

Plains is using flawed math for capital allocation decisions.  And, Kelcy may be back on the hunt for acquisitions to continue building his pipeline empire at ET.

The energy sector has been roundly criticized for overinvesting. Investors who favor companies where the rigor of PE analysis is applied to future projects could find that better capital allocation decisions follow. In our portfolios, we are biased towards companies likely to choose their investments wisely.

We invest in CEQP, ENCL, EPD,  ET, LNG, KMI, TGE, PAA via Plains GP Holdings.

SL Advisors is the sub-advisor to the Catalyst MLP & Infrastructure Fund.  To learn more about the Fund,  please click here.

SL Advisors is also the advisor to an ETF (USAIETF.com).

Plains All American (PAA) held their investor day last week. Continued growth in output from the Permian in West Texas is driving new pipeline construction, for which PAA is at the forefront. Limited pipeline capacity has hurt economics for some drillers that have resorted to trucks to move their crude, which is far more expensive.

PAA’s Supply and Logistics (S&L) business thrives on infrastructure constraints, since it allows them to exploit basis differentials using spare capacity on their pipeline network. From 2014-17 S&L EBITDA collapsed by 90%, as spare capacity came online. It has since rebounded to $450MM, around two thirds of its 2014 peak.

One analyst asked about the impact of new pipelines, both on the S&L business (where PAA expects to see EBITDA drop 50% next year) as well as on existing pipelines which face possible cannibalization of demand:

“You’re creating your own weather when you think of the S&L impact…there’s a lot of moving parts here…Loss of marketing, loss of basin flows, loss of potentially some spot barrels on Bridgetex”

Executives wouldn’t be drawn into discussing the impact in more detail, which was a pity because an investor day is supposed to offer an opportunity to dig more deeply into a company’s business. The response was:

“The guidance for this year fully reflects our views of how that impact is…we’ll give guidance later in the year for 2020… I don’t think we’re going to specifically work towards guidance during this meeting today, that’s not the intent.”

This interaction captures the conundrum facing investors. The Shale Revolution’s dramatic increase in oil and gas production isn’t yet profiting midstream infrastructure investors. One reason is fear that the industry will overbuild, pressuring pipeline tariffs and leading to projects that fail to cover their cost of capital.

PAA laudably tried to demonstrate financial discipline with two slides illustrating how they think about their cost of capital versus their return on invested capital. For any company, the spread between these two is the main source of profits.

So it was disappointing to see errors and omissions. Distributable Cash Flow (DCF) as a cost of equity was based simply on the current DCF yield without adding anticipated long term growth, though investors are told to expect such growth of 10% this year and presumably further growth beyond.

The problem in using current EBITDA as the basis for assessing projects is that it doesn’t reflect the long term return on assets with years of useful life and fluctuating tariffs. It omits corporate overhead, maintenance, cost for potential delays and cost overruns. Most investors calculate the net present value of cashflows from a proposed investment, discounted using a rate appropriate to the risk.

PAA isn’t calculating their cost of equity properly. More correct would be to use the dividend yield plus long term expected growth rate. The growth rate is derived from the portion of retained earnings not paid out (i.e.  1 minus the payout ratio) times the return on equity, which PAA shows has historically been 19.5%.

Although they’re targeting 130-150% coverage of their distribution, it’s currently 2X. Raising the dividend such that it was 150% covered would give them a yield of 8.5% (versus 6.37% currently). 150% coverage  equals a 67% payout ratio. 1 minus the payout ratio, or 33%, times their 19.5% ROE, implies a 6.5% growth rate, which should be added to the projected 8.5% dividend yield.

So PAA’s own figures and assumptions suggest their cost of equity is really around 15%, not the 12.1% they presented. PAA’s Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC), using their desired 55/45 equity/debt split and with a 4.25% interest rate on their debt, is almost 10.2%, 1.6% higher than they presented.

Since they seek an investment return of 3-5% above their WACC, any project needs a return of 13-15%. Riskier projects need an even higher return than this. The Alpha Crude Connector acquisition failed to meet this hurdle.

This minimum return on new projects is further illustrated through their desired leverage of 3-3.5X Debt:EBITDA. Assuming they continue to finance their investments with 45% debt, anything new must have an EBITDA multiple (i.e. cost of investment divided by EBITDA) of no higher than 7X. 3.25 leverage (the midpoint of their 3-3.5 range) divided by 45% debt share of finance is 7.2, which equates to around 14% (1 divided by 7.2), the midpoint of the required return we calculated based on their WACC.

The 55/45 ratio between equity and debt could be unsustainable if EBITDA falls. For example, a manageable 4X Debt:EBITDA leverage ratio would become an unsustainable 8X if EBITDA later dropped by half. Building in the possibility of lower tariffs in the future means debt should be less than 45% of the capital, which raises the WACC since equity is more expensive.

It’s also why you want to own strategic assets that don’t face huge drop-offs in revenues after initial contracts expire.

The flaw in PAA’s math can be illustrated by showing that they’d be willing to raise capital at today’s cost to buy an identical enterprise to their own, with identical EBITDA. Using their own cost of capital and 2019 EBITDA, they’d value this twin at over $33BN. Adjusting for debt, the twin’s equity would be worth $24BN, compared with PAA’s current market cap of only $17BN. Their math allows that PAA could pay up to a 39% premium to buy a business identical to what they own before the acquisition would no longer be accretive.

This is why investors are usually unenthusiastic when management teams announce another growth project. PAA, like most of its peers, should be more willing to repurchase shares.

The stock’s poor performance over the past five years is due to poor capital allocation decisions, probably driven by faulty logic such as described here.

No sell-side analyst pointed this out, but the shareholders who have lived it understand the flaws in PAA’ internal investment process.

Meanwhile, PAA is a cheap stock, trading at just 8X cash flows that are growing, assuming management is more prudent with investors’ money than over the past five years. The industry’s fortunes will turn on correctly calculating the spread between cost of, versus the return on, invested capital.

We are invested in PAA, via Plains GP Holdings.

The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is a widely accepted theoretical framework for valuing securities. An important feature is the Efficient Frontier. This reflects the concept that, although there’s an almost infinite number of portfolios that an investor can hold (think of all the individual stocks and bonds out there), a small number of these portfolios offer a combination of return and risk that’s better than most.

For example, if two portfolios had the same risk, the one with the higher return would be preferable. We can always figure out with hindsight what was the efficient portfolio — identifying the right one going forward is more difficult.

CAPM is a useful theoretical framework but has its shortcomings. One of the biggest is the idea that more risky investments deliver a higher return. It seems intuitively self-evident, but there’s plenty of research to show it’s not true. Beta, a measure of how risky a stock is compared to the market (which has a Beta of 1.0), suggests that high beta stocks (Beta > 1.0) should deliver higher returns than the market. Otherwise, investors wouldn’t own high beta stocks because they wouldn’t be getting sufficiently compensated for the increased risk.

The real world often fails to conform to neat algebraic solutions, and it turns out that low beta stocks do better. They don’t move as much and offer less excitement. Low Beta stocks receive less coverage on CNBC, since traders want movement. But they are Aesop’s tortoise, reaching the finish line ahead of their more energetic competition.

This weakness in CAPM is called the Low Beta Anomaly, and for those interested in learning more you can read Why the Tortoise Beats the Hare.

Returning to the Efficient Frontier, although we can’t be certain what investments provide the most CAPM efficiency, we can make informed assumptions about whether they’re becoming more or less attractive within this framework. Investors complain about heightened volatility in midstream, and likely assume more of the same in assessing the sector. For many, Energy infrastructure sits well within the Efficient Frontier boundary, making it unattractive.

But Energy Infrastructure, as we wrote last week (see Pipeline Stocks Get That Warm Feeling Again), is becoming less volatile, especially when compared with broad energy as represented by the S&P Energy ETF (XLE). On the Efficient Frontier chart, this is moving it to the left, meaning it’s becoming less risky.

Returns are also improving, as defined by Free Cash Flow (FCF) generation. We wrote about this a few weeks ago (see The Coming Pipeline Cash Gusher). The members of the broad-based American Energy Independence Index generated just $1BN in FCF last year, which is an inconsequential return on around $540BN in market cap. However, a combination of lower spending on new projects (lower growth capex) plus improving cash flow from existing assets (higher Distributable Cash Flow, DCF) is set to boost sector FCF significantly over the next three years. By 2021 the $45BN in FCF we estimate would produce a FCF yield of over 8%, higher than the S&P500.

Making volatility forecasts is an imprecise task, and most investors will be satisfied with using historical data. This shows decreasing volatility, or risk. But it’s certainly possible to make return forecasts and they don’t need to have any relationship with recent history. Rising FCF should persuade investors that their return assumption for the sector can be revised up.

In the context of CAPM, higher return with less risk mean that the sector is shifting up and to the left, making it more attractive. The Efficient Frontier is a theoretical concept, and investments selected from along that line can all be judged efficient, with the different combination of return and risk reflecting investor preference.

As this virtuous combination of rising return with falling volatility becomes apparent, we think some investors will conclude that midstream energy infrastructure lies beyond the Efficient Frontier. This should attract inflows from investors who use this type of framework to assess opportunities.

When CAPM provides a buy signal, the much-sought generalist investor will have finally turned to pipelines. Over the next couple of years, the sector should benefit from this development.

SL Advisors is the sub-advisor to the Catalyst MLP & Infrastructure Fund.  To learn more about the Fund,  please click here.

SL Advisors is also the advisor to an ETF (USAIETF.com).

 

 

 

 

New pipelines are becoming harder to build. New York recently blocked a natural gas pipeline planned by Williams Companies (WMB) because of environmental concerns, although WMB plans to reapply. Canada is becoming a more difficult and expensive place in which to build (other than in oil-rich Alberta). Enbridge (ENB) went as far as to say they wouldn’t attempt a new, greenfield crude oil pipeline in Canada. They regard the permitting process as capricious, hijacked by a small minority of vocal environmental activists that don’t reflect the public interest.

Impeding new construction simply increases the value of the existing asset base. It also means that today’s dominant firms will maintain their market positions in the future; this is not an industry where a disruptive start-up has realistic prospects.

It also creates an unusual alignment of interests between anti-fossil fuel, environmental activists and investors who are clamoring for a greater return of cash to owners. Both are opposed to new spending, albeit for different reasons.

Tellurian (TELL) is developing a Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) export complex. Their unusual financing model involves raising equity capital from customers. In this way they share some of the project’s upside and create key long term partnerships. They see growing Permian crude production leading to a huge jump in associated natural gas output, creating the need for an additional 20 Billion Cubic Feet per day (BCF/D) of LNG export capacity.

Incidentally, in a panel on LNG, Andy Orekar of Gaslog Partners said that if all the world’s shipping converted to LNG (because of the impending IMO 2020 standards on maritime emissions) it would consume more than all of the current trade in LNG. Currently, gas-powered ships are limited to LNG tankers that consume a small portion of their cargo for power. It’s a theoretical point since the industry is installing sulfur scrubbers and switching to cleaner crude oil-based fuels, but an interesting one nonetheless.

Today the U.S. exports around 4 BCF/D. Because natural gas is an inevitable byproduct of crude production in the Permian, TELL expects the economics of oil to drive more gas output which will need to be sent somewhere. They believe the Permian may produce as much as 30BCF/D, creating a need for almost all proposed LNG projects. Increased domestic consumption and pipeline exports to Mexico will only soak up so much, with seaborne LNG exports being critical to avoid constraints on crude production. Flaring unwanted natural gas is limited, and the larger companies that are now dominating Permian activity are especially likely to avoid the negative publicity associated with such obvious waste.

Private equity has developed into an alternative source of financing for midstream infrastructure since public market valuations essentially render equity financing prohibitive. This highlights the contrast between how public and private markets view the sector. Although private funds can compete effectively for projects, it’s also made exits harder, leading to longer holding periods that can reduce returns. The traditional arbitrage, in which public buyers acquire assets at higher multiples than paid by private equity, is currently being reversed. This reflects the continued public market wariness of midstream energy infrastructure, and highlights currently attractive valuations.

Most firms now have a set of policies covering ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance). This is regarded by some as a requirement for drawing in generalist investor interest. One company noted that European investors were more likely to use ESG as a screening metric, and reported that they had seen a notable pick up in interest from non-traditional investors in response to their adopting ESG policies. Mentioning Energy Transfer (ET) in the context of ESG invariably draws a chuckle (see Why Energy Transfer Can’t Get Respect)

A meeting with Enterprise Products Partners (EPD) produced some useful insights. They regard U.S. crude oil export infrastructure as still catching up with volumes. Building a facility to accommodate Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) is an important objective for them. The application to build this terminal was 13,000 pages and weighed 100 lbs.

EPD also sees very strong Chinese demand for U.S. exports of ethane and propane, with the current trade dispute not regarded as a long-term problem.

The “War on Plastics” led them to point out the slide shown below, which highlights how much of global plastics pollution can be traced back to ineffective disposal among some Asian countries.

Overall, the news was good and growing free cash flows are beginning to draw interest from a wider pool of investors. We left with reinforced conviction that valuations are excessively pessimistic. Strong returns lie ahead.

We are invested in ENB, EPD, ET, TELL and WMB.

SL Advisors is the sub-advisor to the Catalyst MLP & Infrastructure Fund.  To learn more about the Fund,  please click here.

SL Advisors is also the advisor to an ETF (USAIETF.com).

Warren Buffett likes the Permian Basin. This was clear from Berkshire’s (BRK) proposed $10BN preferred investment in Occidental (OXY) should they buy Anadarko (APC). Berkshire’s annual shareholder meeting was followed as usual with a Becky Quick interview on CNBC.

The 8% dividend on the preferred OXY will issue to finance their acquisition could be inducement enough for BRK to commit $10BN. When Becky commented on this Buffett responded “It isn’t great to have an 8% preferred if there isn’t any oil there.   It’s a bet on oil prices over the long term more than anything else and it’s also a bet on the fact that the Permian basin is what’s it’s cracked up to be. … You have to have a view on oil over time and Charlie and I have got some views on that.”

This led Becky to ask why BRK didn’t use some of its cash hoard to buy Anardarko for $35BN, to which Buffett replied “Well, that might have happened if Anadarko had come to us.”  Buffett was quick to clarify that he wouldn’t jump in to a bidding war with someone who has come to them for financing. Buffett wants more supplicants for similar deals. But it does show that they see value in the Permian Basin, OXY and APC.

The competition between Chevron (CVX) and OXY to buy APC provides further confirmation of a bullish production outlook among those with the best information. CVX and OXY were the two biggest producers in the Permian last year, each pumping over 300 thousand barrels per day (MB/D). APC did 100 MB/D. They know the region. Rystad Energy believes that a CVX/APC combination would reach almost 1.4 Million Barrels per Day (MMB/D) in output by 2025. A match-up of OXY/APC would get to 0.9 MMB/D. Permian volumes are growing fast, and the influx of additional capital makes this even more likely. Midstream energy infrastructure is a sure winner.

As always, Buffett had some wonderful folksy quips. In discussing his 60-year partnership with Charlie Munger, he noted that they’d often disagreed but never had an argument. Munger sometimes concludes such debates with, “You’ll agree with me soon, because you’re smart and I’m right.”

Try using that at home with your significant other. Let us know how it goes – we’ll publish any credible stories.

Buffett and Munger aren’t overly concerned about the latest ratcheting up of trade tensions. They believe both sides will benefit from concluding a deal. We agree that trade tensions are unlikely to be a factor entering 2020 when Trump is running for re-election (see The Trump Put).  One easy way to reduce the trade deficit is for China to increase it’s purchases of raw materials from the U.S. This could include huge amounts of LNG, natural gas liquids such as propane, and light crude oil that they desperately want and need.

If the dispute is drawn out, planned Chinese purchases of U.S. Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) are at risk. But LNG is fungible, and U.S. exports could displace trade to other Asian countries whose shipments would in turn head to China. Cheniere Energy (ticker: LNG) and Chinese energy firm Sinopec are planning a 20 year LNG deal once the trade negotiations are concluded.

While a full-blown trade war that severely damages global GDP growth can have a meaningful impact on oil demand and oil prices, a resolution should boost demand and clear the way for Chinese buyers to sign long-term contracts from U.S oil and gas exporters.

Moreover, the U.S. just dispatched aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln to the Persian Gulf so as to, “send a clear and unmistakable message to the Iranian regime…” The Shale Revolution has improved America’s ability to press our interests since we are so much less dependent on Middle East oil. Trump is not one to shy away from a fight. We won’t forecast how events with Iran will play out – but domestic energy investments are one of the safer places to be if there is conflict with Iran.

With historically low valuations for the energy sector, record oil & gas production, and solid growth prospects, the weekend’s news is showing energy to be one of the most overlooked areas in the market.

We are long BRK.

SL Advisors is the sub-advisor to the Catalyst MLP & Infrastructure Fund.  To learn more about the Fund,  please click here.

SL Advisors is also the advisor to an ETF (USAIETF.com).