Approximately 80% of our investments in midstream energy infrastructure are corporations – we invest in MLPs selectively. There’s a big difference between investing in pipeline corporations with their wide investor base, and MLPs whose pool of natural buyers is withering.

That’s why eight of the ten biggest names in the American Energy Independence Index (AEITR) are corporations. Last week, Bloomberg published Pipeline Funds Imperiled With Even MLPGuy Seeing Their End. MLP-dedicated funds, and more importantly their investors, face some tough decisions in the months ahead.

MLPs long ago lost the support of their traditional investor: the older, wealthy American willing to accept the tax complexity of a K-1 in exchange for attractive, tax-deferred yields. The Alerian MLP ETF (AMLP) has cut distributions by a third since 2014, reflecting what MLPs have done (see When Will MLPs Recover?). These investors feel betrayed, and they’re not coming back.

The Alerian MLP Infrastructure Index (AMZI), which is what AMLP tries to track, has a float-adjusted market cap of just $61BN. This is too small to justify a sector-based approach, a point made in the past by CBRE’s Hinds Howard (known as @MLPGuy on Twitter). Regulatory limits cap holdings of big MLPs, causing smaller MLPs to be overweighted. The AEITR is 73% companies rated BBB or better, compared with  just  42% in the AMZI.

Publicly traded funds represent an important part of the MLP investor base. At the end of February, Wells Fargo estimated there was $30BN in such funds, of which Closed End Funds (CEFs) represented over 40%. Showing arrogant recklessness, these CEFs entered March with leverage of up to 40%, and in the subsequent forced deleveraging they blew up.

We’ve often warned about this, most recently in November (see Should Closed End Funds Use Leverage?). Their rapid demise contributed significantly to the overall selling of MLPs in mid-March. These portfolio managers owe everyone else an apology (see The Virus Infecting MLPs). It’s been the worst month in memory for pipelines — the AEITR is -40%. But the Kayne Anderson MLP/Midstream Fund (KYN) is down 65% for the month. The Clearbridge Energy MLP Fund (CEM) is -80%. The Tortoise Energy Infrastructure Fund (TYG) is -82%. This group has destroyed most of their client capital. They have no risk management. MLP CEFs no longer exist as a practical matter. They can’t do much more damage.

Open-ended MLP-dedicated mutual funds such as those run by Steelpath (now owned by Invesco), Center Coast Brookfield and Mainstay Cushing face a choice. The extreme volatility and diminished pool of names make it unlikely they’ll attract many new clients. Like AMLP, their complex, tax-inefficient structure has always been a burden, because they pay corporate taxes on profits (see MLP Funds Made for Uncle Sam). Invesco recently had to spend $400 million correcting mis-stated NAVs dating back to 2015 – evidently the tax treatment even confused the fund’s accountants. Today, all these funds are a long way from having to pay corporate taxes.

It must make sense for them to broaden their mandate to include pipeline corporations, whose market cap is roughly twice as big as MLPs. Doing so will place further downward pressure on MLPs as these funds diversify their holdings.

Tax-exempt U.S. institutions and non-U.S. investors rarely invest in MLPs, because they face onerous tax liabilities if they do. Valuations are so depressed that some may decide it’s worth the trouble. But they’re likely to stick to the big three of Enterprise Products (EPD), Energy Transfer (ET) and Magellan Midstream (MMP).

The result is that it’s hard to identify much natural demand for MLPs. By contrast, pipeline corporations can be bought by anyone. This absence of investors has led to even the three biggest MLPs performing worse than the three biggest pipeline corporations in the last month. The broader trend for pipeline corporations to outperform MLPs began early last year. The American Energy Independence Index is 80% corporations, and has beaten the Alerian MLP Index by 14% since then.

Moreover, compared with pipeline corporations, MLPs are (1) more exposed to crude oil with less natural gas, where demand is more stable, (2) more exposed to gathering and processing, which depends heavily on production from the specific areas served, (3) riskier credits, with more BBB- (one notch above junk) and below than corporations, and 4) less protective of investor rights, with poorer corporate governance and in some cases blatant conflicts of interest. In other words, the MLP-dedicated portfolio has more of what’s most vulnerable (see Today’s Pipelines Leave MLPs Behind).

The smaller MLPs are especially short of natural buyers. Years ago when the MLP industry had its own conference, StonMor (STON) was an incongruous participant as an MLP in the “deathcare” business (funeral homes and cemeteries). They had a complex structure even for an MLP, and they were out of place among energy investors. They’re now a corporation, and following various self-inflicted problems in 2016 are trading at roughly 5% of their value from years back. They didn’t fit in anybody’s portfolio.

MLPs unable to interest institutions will similarly struggle to attract natural buyers.

Investors in MLP-dedicated strategies should ask themselves: who are the likely buyers of what they own? For now, everything is so cheap that they could easily bounce. But over the longer run, we think MLP-dedicated funds will wish to diversify, which could mean selling most of their MLPs and buying pipeline corporations. A conversion of one of the big three would probably force the issue.

This will hurt performance, and nobody wants to be invested in the last fund to make that shift. Diversified exposure to midstream energy infrastructure through corporations, with just a handful of big MLPs, offers plenty of upside once we get past the coronavirus. But CEF investors saw their MLP allocations reduced in a fire sale, thanks to incompetent portfolio management. Having incinerated most of their investors’ capital, MLP CEFs won’t be a source of demand going forward. High net worth investors have been abandoning MLPs for years. ESG funds buy the biggest pipeline corporations (see our video ESG Investors Like Pipelines) but not MLPs because of their weak governance.

Open-ended ETFs and mutual funds that are loaded up with MLPs are likely to diversify. So if a portfolio of MLPs no longer makes sense, their only place is as part of a bigger portfolio. And if an investor owns just a few MLPs, she’s likely to focus on the big ones. A portfolio of MLPs has an uncertain future.

Disclosure: SL Advisors manages investment products designed to incorporate the advantages described above.

As our response to Coronavirus shifts from purely medical to political, markets have seen a glimmer of light. So far, decisions have been made, whether right or wrong, based on advice from epidemiologists. But as the economic cost has exploded, it’s provoked the obvious question: if the most vulnerable cohorts are identifiable, and the vast majority unlikely to require hospitalization, does everyone need to be at home?

Comparing fatalities with lost jobs seems crass; but something this big is a political issue that considers the overall impact to the country. A study from Oxford University suggested that up to half the UK population may already be infected. This would imply a very low fatality rate and very limited hospitalization, a huge positive if it turns out to be accurate.

When Thomas Friedman of the New York Times and Donald Trump agree that we need some certainty about when restrictions on life will be lifted, you know where the debate is headed. Coronavirus remains most importantly an issue of science, and we won’t offer any amateur views. But decisions are likely to reflect not only medical input from here. Barring a sudden deterioration, we expect governors such as New York’s Andrew Cuomo to soon define a timeframe that will see many people return to work.

Pipeline investors care about volumes. Weekly data from the Energy Information Administration shows little impact so far on natural gas demand. Residential/Commercial is down – mild winter weather has probably depressed Residential, and Commercial may also be lower. But overall the figures look stable.

EIA supply figures look similarly stable, although the chart from Criterion Research is a few days more current and shows a sharp drop. Ultimately though, if demand stays flat supply will recover.

Gasoline demand hadn’t yet dropped, based on this chart through Monday. Drivers filling their tanks in case of distribution problems probably helped, but demand is obviously going to fall with most of us at home.

Unemployment claims on Thursday will be important. JPMorgan is forecasting a 6X jump from last week, to 1.5 million. The highest forecast is for 4 million. For reference, on October 2, 1982 the figure was 695,000. In the depths of the financial crisis on March 28, 2009, we hit 665,000. So we’re likely to see the biggest figure in history.

Closed end fund investors are passionate about the product. Because they generally own a portfolio of publicly traded securities, their NAV per share is easily calculated. The fixed share count means their share price can deviate from the NAV, and this attracts investors keen to buy something for less than it’s worth.

MLP closed end funds have been around for years. They’re a low-octane version of levered ETFs. If you’re good at market-timing, a skill claimed by far more than actually possess it, you can navigate the ups and downs. Leverage magnifies your exposure, and strategies with fixed leverage have to rebalance in the direction the market has moved (i.e. buy high and sell low).

We have warned investors about this before (see Lose Money Fast with Levered ETFs).

In 2015 we pointed out how the Cushing MLP Total Return Fund (SRV) had persistently destroyed value, because of leverage (see An Apocalyptic Fund Story).

MLP closed end funds use leverage. Because they are more than 25% invested in MLPs, they are non-RIC compliant and therefore their profits are subject to corporate income tax. The interest expense on their borrowings can be deducted against taxable income, thereby reducing or even offsetting the tax obligation that few holders realize exists.

But adding leverage to a single sector fund is a dumb idea. Investment grade midstream energy infrastructure companies generally operate at around 4.0X Debt:EBITDA. Non-investment grade are a little higher. The manager of a sector-specific leveraged fund is essentially rejecting this leverage as too conservative, even though such a fund has little diversification in a sharp fall in the market.

This is an expression of arrogance, that the managers of these funds have some insight superior to the collective opinion of CFOs and rating agencies. They don’t. They are just willing to gamble other people’s money that they do.

An investor pointed out to me leverage at some of these funds, from fact sheets recently published at the end of February. Goldman was running a fund with 35% leverage. Tortoise had one with 40%. YTD these funds were down 85% and 95% respectively as of 2pm today.

Given the collapse in March, these funds have all been forced sellers. As long-only investors we are down a lot. But the delevering of MLP CEFs has exacerbated the drop for everyone. Leveraged MLP closed end funds are a financial virus that is infecting the rest of the sector, by driving prices even lower. They harm all investors, but most especially the poor souls who sadly bought them. Fortunately, most of these funds are nearly dead, with little capital remaining to protect.

Client interaction has been overwhelmingly constructive – we haven’t had a single call from anyone wanting to “sell everything.” Our fund has seen very modest net outflows, and new money has been coming in every day.

One investor said on the weekend that we need to present the positive case more forcefully. So, here it is:

• Our midstream energy infrastructure investments and the components of the American Energy Independence Index are >75% investment grade companies. The industry has been reducing leverage and strengthening balance sheets since the 2014-16 oil collapse. Growth projects are increasingly funded with cash from operations, with less reliance on debt and no equity issuance. 4X Debt:EBITDA is common, using 2020 guidance which will be revised down in the coming weeks.
• We estimate around 80% of the customers of our portfolio companies are themselves investment grade. Cheniere Energy is 100% in this respect, so although they’re in the 25% of our companies that’s not investment grade, the credit quality of their customer base provides some comfort.
  
• While energy demand will dip, and economic activity is contracting, there’s plenty of reason to think that in the weeks and months ahead all the efforts at mitigation and control will leave society confronting a new but manageable virus. Getting through the near term is understandably everyone’s focus, but life will eventually return to something we all recognize. Global crude demand fell just 2%% from 2007 to 2009. Natural gas volumes were unaffected. Demand may fall more than then, and supply further still. Although exports are more important than before, the U.S. pipeline business is mostly natural gas and NGLs (primarily petrochemical feedstock), and is mostly about U.S. consumption. We estimate that crude & refined products contribute just 20% of cash flows.
• Companies can improve cash flow by curtailing growth projects. Upstream companies are likely to cut production and growth capex by 20-40%. So far, Oneok (OKE) is the only midstream company to have issued any revised guidance, and they reduced 2020 growth capex by $500MM (20%), while surprisingly reaffirming EBITDA guidance. In Updating the Coming Pipeline Cash Gusher we forecast 2020 Free Cash Flow (FCF) of $22BN (up from $9BN last year). This forecast relies on guidance from companies that is all pre-Coronavirus. However, it also incorporates $37BN of capex spending this year. It’s quite conceivable that pipeline companies’ capex reductions could more than offset any drop in cash flow from operations. We were assuming Distributable Cash Flow (DCF) of $59BN. FCF is derived from DCF minus growth capex. If DCF fell by 20%, which is not in any forecast we’ve seen so far, growth capex would likely drop by more, which would cushion the ultimate impact on FCF.
• Unlike the 2015 downturn, capex is now internally financed. Midstream energy infrastructure companies stopped accessing public markets for equity a couple of years ago, and have no need to do so now. Moreover, debt is long-term and staggered. We don’t see near-term debt financing problems.
• Lastly, assuming an average 20% decline in growth capex similar to Oneok’s announcement, the sector trades at a 2021E 15.6% FCF yield (that’s after capex), fully supporting its 13% dividend yield. Few other sectors have such valuation support today.

The energy sector has taken a triple hit from Coronavirus, OPEC+ collapse and Saudi supply hikes. Investors are most worried about which names will survive. Those with leverage were forced to sell last week, notably including MLP closed end funds. We don’t use leverage and haven’t been forced to sell anything, either for ourselves or for client accounts. Today for example, we have not made a single sale. Sit tight. This will eventually pass. It’s not inconceivable that prices could eventually double from here.

Once America confronts a challenge, history shows that we deploy unmatched resources to take it on and defeat it. The impact on society arrived like a thunderbolt in recent days, and as a country we’ve been knocked on our heels. But our response is coming, and no country is better equipped to come right back and do whatever is required to overwhelm this threat.

Bankruptcy risk is the topic investors want to discuss in calls this week. Within the American Energy Independence Index, the pipeline industry is 80% investment grade companies. We estimate that around 20% of it is direct exposure to crude oil pipelines. 80% of their customers are themselves investment grade.

During the 2008 financial crisis, crude oil consumption dropped 10% and natural gas was unaffected (see With Energy Uncertainty, Natural Gas Offers Stability).

These are some of the facts and figures investors should rely on in assessing the outlook. Then we have to judge how Americans are going to respond to the spread of coronavirus. Everybody can form their own judgment, because none of us has any prior experience with the issue. Avoidance of the virus is far more economically destructive than the sickness itself.

German chancellor Angela Merkel said two in three Germans may become infected in the years ahead. It seems that it’ll be hard to avoid.

Companies are lowering their growth capex plans for this year, which will improve Free Cash Flow (FCF) from what it would otherwise be. Oneok (OKE) yesterday reaffirmed their 2020 EBITDA guidance, while cutting capex.

The OPEC+ collapse and subsequent Saudi production increase are a direct hit at a sector that’s been under pressure for years. A month ago, the outlook was positive with FCF set to rise sharply.

None of us knows how society will respond in the weeks ahead. The best advice we can offer is that this is generally an investment grade industry, and that while energy consumption will temporarily drop, it will recover. The components of the index have a trailing dividend yield of 13%, with payout ratios of just 60%.