The Fed’s Aspirational Base Case

SL Advisors Talks Markets
SL Advisors Talks Markets
The Fed’s Aspirational Base Case
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There were few places to hide last quarter. The S&P500 was –4.6% with nine of its eleven sectors losing. Energy sparkled at +39% and Utilities were +4.8%. Bonds were even worse, with the Bloomberg Aggregate –6.2%. Close to our hearts, pipelines (as defined by the American Energy Independence Index) were +24.5%.

Low yields have underpinned stocks for many years, so a deteriorating Equity Risk Premium (ERP) is weakening the case for “TINA” (There Is No Alternative). Although bonds remain a long way from offering a fair return, yields have risen far enough that stocks no longer look compelling. Factset bottom-up estimates for S&P500 EPS growth are 9%, putting the ERP close to its 20 year average. As a successful and now retired bond trader used to say, 3% on the ten year note is only a nine iron away. This would make stocks look decidedly neutral.

Correctly calling interest rates is of greater import to one’s equity portfolio. JPMorgan produced an interesting chart that shows bond yields and equity returns are more highly correlated when rates are low. There’s no doubt low rates have driven investors to assume greater risk. Inconveniently, most of this relationship is since the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), so it’s unclear if the correlation has risen because rates are low, or because something changed structurally following the GFC. If ten year yields move above 3.6%, JPMorgan’s chart suggests the correlation will turn negative, meaning rising rates would be good for stocks. It’s hard to imagine, but inflation is changing many things.

Larry Summers and Bill Dudley are competing via erudite blog posts for the title of most articulate Fed critic. Dudley recently said that The Fed has made a U.S. recession inevitable thanks to its slothful removal of monetary support. Jamie Dimon said in his annual letter that “the medicine (fiscal spending and QE) was probably too much and lasted too long.”

Summers warned investors, The stock market liked the Fed’s plan to raise interest rates. It’s wrong. He took issue with the recently released FOMC forecast, which presents an impossibly optimistic outlook. He notes that the Fed is expecting inflation to moderate while pushing Fed Funds barely above their neutral target, all while maintaining close to full employment. Should Jay Powell and his FOMC colleagues pull this off, they will have threaded the proverbial needle and challenged economic orthodoxy. It’s more correctly an objective, or an upside case, rather than a forecast. No business could submit a budget with such hopeful outcomes.

This makes the future path of interest rates quite wide. If inflation doesn’t moderate, will the Fed push rates high enough to cause higher unemployment? How willing will they be to risk a recession?  In August 2020 chair Powell revealed a subtle but significant change in how they regard their dual mandate of maximum employment consistent with stable prices.

Decades of declining real rates and an unemployment rate that continued to fall without causing wage pressures persuaded the Fed to allow inflation more upside than in the past. Since that symposium two years ago in Jackson their policy, “emphasizes that maximum employment is a broad-based and inclusive goal.” Data shows that minorities suffer employment more quickly than the general population, so the Fed is presumably now more sensitive to minority rates of unemployment. This isn’t necessarily a bad policy, but it is a modification and comes with increased tolerance for inflation.

The Fed now assesses “shortfalls” not “deviations” from maximum employment, since “employment can run at or above real-time estimates of its maximum level without causing concern.” And most notably, “following periods when inflation has been running below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.”

Both Dudley and Summers impose a traditional Fed policy function on today’s situation. That would regard our current inflation spike as a manifest policy error demanding a prompt response. By contrast, Powell has admitted that inflation is too high but has yet to concede a policy error. Their revised consensus statement allows for some inflation risk in pursuit of getting everyone a job, so 7.9% inflation is less of a mistake than if, say, Paul Volcker was in charge.

If the FOMC projections turn out to be correct, stocks will do very well. The risk for equities is that inflation doesn’t moderate as expected – will an FOMC stung by their error tighten too much in response? Or will they place greater importance on near term maximum employment, always waiting for another month of hopefully better data? It’s unclear, but if Larry Summers is right that the FOMC forecasts are short on “intellectual rigor and honest realism” the Fed’s fealty to their reinterpreted mandate will be tested.

Perhaps because we cover interest rates and energy markets, connections often leap out. It’s politically correct (even “woke”) to assume wildly unrealistic assumptions about renewables, because it suggests endorsement of the policies required. So JPMorgan includes a chart showing global primary energy from renewables reaching a 60% share by 2050 from under 5% today. Fossil fuel use collapses so that oil, gas and coal in aggregate are less than 20% of primary energy use in 2050 versus 78% today.

Because JPMorgan is not quite as idealistic as the chart suggests, an extensive footnote warns that it’s based on the Net Zero outlook from this year’s BP Energy Outlook. The Net Zero scenario, which isn’t BP’s central case, roughly aligns with the UN’s goals. In other words, it’s what many climate scientists believe should be happening, not necessarily what they expect.  JPMorgan adds that forecasts are “not a reliable indicator of future performance.” In other words, it’s not their forecast.

Ten years ago JPMorgan published a series of charts based on work by highly regarded polymath Vaclav Smil on the slow pace of energy transitions. It took coal 60 years after reaching 5% to provide half the world’s energy. Oil and natural gas still haven’t reached that level and probably never will. The forecast that renewables will provide half the world’s energy within two decades is aspirational, and even less likely to be accurate than the Fed’s. Any serious effort to reduce emissions will use more natural gas instead of coal, increase nuclear power substantially and incorporate carbon capture. Improbable forecasts that are presented as Base Case are never good. Larry Summers would agree.

We have three funds that seek to profit from this environment:

Energy Mutual Fund Energy ETF Inflation Fund

Please see important Legal Disclosures.

 

Energy Investors Unfazed By US Selling Oil

SL Advisors Talks Markets
SL Advisors Talks Markets
Energy Investors Unfazed By US Selling Oil
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The Administration’s planned release of 1 million barrels of oil a day from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is borne of their frustration with high prices. Average crude prices have been higher under Biden than Trump, even after adjusting for the collapse during Covid (not Trump’s fault) and the jump following Russia’s invasion (not Biden’s fault).

For energy investors like us, Biden has been a huge improvement. Trump knew he wanted lots of production to keep prices low and promote American Energy Independence. Executives were emboldened by a government they perceived as supportive. The results were good for consumers but ruinous for investors.

Although the correlation between the price of crude and pipeline stocks isn’t as strong as many think, rising prices that reflect strong underlying demand have boosted returns. For the quarter just ended, the pipeline sector returned +24.6% versus –4.5% for the S&P500.

New Jersey still mandates attendants at gas stations to fill your car. It’s a trivial yet tiresome rule – people should have a choice to pump their own gas, since it’s quicker. But recently, watching the attendant as the register ticked up past $80, I nearly jumped out and gave him a high five. Clients of SL Advisors are benefiting from White House energy policies.

We hold a minority view. Presidents have less control over oil prices than voters think, although Biden could claim some credit for the energy sector’s resurgence if he wanted to.

The White House thinks US energy companies are being abstruse in failing to respond to higher prices by increasing production. They must have advisers that understand why the sector is apparently denying itself even greater profitability, but their public comments and policies don’t reflect this.

Crude oil is in backwardation, meaning that the futures strip is downward sloping. Spot oil prices get the attention because they drive what voters pay at the pump. Production decisions are based on what produced oil and gas can be sold for over the next few years. As with almost any business, capital has to be invested up front with the expectation of a future return. If the curve was upwards sloping (contango), that would allow drillers to sell forward production at prices higher than today’s, creating the additional supply the Administration wants. It’s been in backwardation for the past year, and Russia’s invasion exacerbated this – meaning the effect on prices was more pronounced on the front month futures that impact gasoline prices than it was on the rest of the strip which drives investment decisions.

Moreover, oil companies can’t suddenly turn on a spigot. The list of reasons why current output hasn’t responded to prices as much as it might have five years ago includes (1) financial discipline, (2) White House long term anti-fossil fuel policies, (3) ESG opposition, (4) an increasingly capricious regulatory and judicial process for proposed and completed infrastructure projects, and (5) service provider inflation.

If you assume an oil well could be brought online in a year and produce equal volumes over the next four years, forward production could be hedged at $80, versus the June futures price of $101. Although futures prices are poor predictors, an E&P company that produces without hedging is just speculating on future oil prices. Investors can do that themselves with crude futures, so there’s little value added for the E&P company to do so themselves.

The SPR release of 1 Million Barrels per Day (MMB/D) over six months is an understandable political reaction, but isn’t likely to alter prices much, because it’s temporary. At about 1% of global demand, it will reduce our SPR to 345 million barrels, 48% of capacity and the lowest since 1983. Reducing crude in storage will increase our vulnerability to supply shocks from a hurricane for example. And depending on the compatibility between the grades of crude released and domestic refining infrastructure, these extra barrels may wind up being exported.

Goldman Sachs thinks use of the SPR in this way exposes the market to greater turmoil in the event of a further supply disruption from Russia.

For energy investors, it’s probably net positive. The economics of investing in new production are modestly worse than before the announced SPR release. But it doesn’t represent new supply, and the brief drop in prices delays the demand destruction that many analysts believe is the only way to balance the market. CEOs understand that the White House’s desire to increase supply is ephemeral and related to the mid-terms. The Administration will regain its former hostility to traditional energy just as soon as they can get gasoline prices off the news headlines.

Concrete steps to streamline the regulatory process and eliminate much of the uncertainty around infrastructure projects could induce some companies to invest more in future production. This is the area to watch for signs that pragmatism is informing the government’s energy policies.

We have three funds that seek to profit from this environment:

Energy Mutual Fund Energy ETF Inflation Fund

Please see important Legal Disclosures.

US Natural Gas Takes Center Stage

SL Advisors Talks Energy
SL Advisors Talks Energy
US Natural Gas Takes Center Stage
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Europe’s realization that it needs a strategy to ensure energy security has provided a further boost to US natural gas stocks. Last week was especially good – NextDecade (NEXT) added another customer for their proposed Rio Grande Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) export facility.

By coincidence we had just interviewed Matthew Mott, SVP of their Next Carbon Solutions division. President Biden also committed to increase US LNG shipments to Europe by 15 Billion Cubic Meters (BCM), equivalent to 1.45 Billion Cubic Feet per Day (BCF/D). US natural gas was already cheap, abundant and the biggest source of global CO2 emissions declines to date (see NextDecade Sees A Bright Future). Following Russia’s war on Ukraine, it is now part of Europe’s energy security too.

Biden’s commitment grabbed headlines but his advisers will know that on current trend 2022 US LNG exports to Europe will already exceed last year’s by more than 15 BCM. LNG facilities take years to build, which provides visibility into how fast our export capacity will grow. Germany has no regasification facilities at which to receive LNG, and the most optimistic forecasts are for one to be in service by the end of next year. The market for Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRUs) is suddenly hot because only a handful are available and they offer Germany a faster route to importing LNG. But not all will operate in the frigid waters off Germany’s north coast. Energy security went from irrelevant to critical in Europe. Getting there won’t be elegant.

Nonetheless, the German government hopes to be no longer reliant on Russian gas imports by the summer of 2024. So far it’s been in both Germany and Russia’s interests to maintain the flow of oil and gas. Germany has no near-term alternative, and Russia is enjoying the higher prices that their invasion has precipitated.

Russia is on notice that it will need to find alternative markets for the gas Germany will no longer want. That will require Russia to build new pipeline infrastructure, likely to their east coast for export as LNG. Western sanctions may impede the timely construction. Since the break in trade between the two countries is so well anticipated, Russia’s history suggests the timing will ultimately be at their choosing and not necessarily when Germany is ready to cut imports entirely.

It’s not a leap to suggest that energy security for any country requires minimizing pipeline imports, since they create dependence on a single supplier that seaborne imports avoid. LNG trade is going to keep growing. And while increased investment in renewables is a natural move to improve security, their input prices are rising too.

US LNG trade is all run by commercial entities. Although Biden’s commitment drew attention, the Federal government isn’t about to get into the natural gas business. More meaningful would be an improved regulatory process that isn’t beholden to the liberal progressive wing of the Democrat party. Hewing to their anti-fossil fuel rhetoric has jeopardized Democrat control of the House in November – gasoline prices were already rising before Russia’s invasion. There are signs the Administration is tilting (pivoting would be too strong) towards a more balanced view of the energy transition.

For example, FERC recently shelved an earlier proposal to include the emissions ultimately generated by the oil/gas passing through any proposed pipeline they were considering for approval. This could even have applied to projects already under construction. Conveniently, last week this led to certificates being approved for two natural gas pipelines (the Evangeline Pass Expansion and Columbia Gulf Transmission’s East Lateral Xpress) that link up to Venture Global’s Plaquemines LNG export facility, among others (see Baby, I Got It – Could The U.S. Alone Meet Biden’s Call For 15 Bcm More LNG To The EU?).

The stalled Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) project run by Equitrans is another example where the Administration could signal a more enlightened policy. While courts can rescind previously issued permits from Federal agencies that were the basis for $BNs of invested capital, energy companies will correctly assess a hostile environment for new projects. Fixing this might require legislation, but like the Keystone XL pipeline that Biden canceled immediately upon taking office, capricious policy has its costs.

The path to increased LNG exports is visible but long. Because it typically takes up to five years from Final Investment Decision (FID) to start-up, it’s possible to project out export capacity well into the future. Of 18.9 BCF/D in projects deemed “High/Medium probability” by Cowen and Company, 11.9 BCF/D are in North America. Russia’s Novatek project may struggle to complete because of western sanctions.

Of the 20 BCF/D in US projects awaiting FID, only 6 BCF/D are on the High/Medium Probability list, whereas we think most if not all of these will eventually be done.

Europe’s energy security and US LNG profitability are now more closely linked. What remains to be seen is whether Administration policy will pragmatically move from a tilt to a pivot away from its extremist liberal wing. So far US LNG has done more to reduce global emissions than anything else.

We have three funds that seek to profit from this environment:

Energy Mutual Fund Energy ETF Inflation Fund

Please see important Legal Disclosures.

 

 

 

 

Markets Lose Faith In 2% Inflation

In mid-January in Why You Shouldn’t Expect A Return To 2% Inflation we explained some of the persistent upward pressures on inflation. Since then ten year inflation expectations derived from the treasury bond market have increased by 0.5%. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a big factor, but nonetheless a half point increase over the next decade is a substantial move. Preserving purchasing power is the point of saving, and inflation entrenched at a higher level investors presents new challenges to investors.

Five year inflation expectations have moved up to 3.5%

Interest rates have moved sharply higher, with the market pricing in at least one 0.50% hike over the next few months and a neutral rate around 2.5%, up from 2% a month ago. Inflation permanently above the Fed’s 2% objective is being priced in.

The list of reasons to expect inflation closer to 4% than 2% over the next several years includes:

  1. Excess fiscal stimulus from Covid. The $1.9TN American Rescue Plan that the Democrats passed shortly after Biden’s inauguration last year is now widely accepted to be the root cause of sharply rising prices. The Federal government boosted consumption even while the Covid vaccine was allowing the economy to re-open.

 

  1. Profligate fiscal policy in #1 was exacerbated by the Federal Reserve’s August 2020 reinterpretation of its mandate to tolerate inflation risk in pursuit of maximum employment. This led them to maintain highly accommodative monetary policy and expansion of their balance sheet for an additional year compared with what more orthodox policy would have required. Note also that this inflation risk tolerance persists. So while everyone can agree today’s 7.9% inflation is too high, once it falls expect the rising unemployment rate to cause much angst at the FOMC.

 

  1. Oil and gas prices were already rising before Russia’s invasion gave them a further boost. Joe Biden ran on a platform of eventually putting traditional energy companies out of business. ESG proponents like Blackrock’s Larry Fink have helped demonize producers of reliable energy. Climate extremists have used the court system to block pipeline projects largely completed. An example is the Mountain Valley Pipeline project owned by EQM Midstream Partners, LP, NextEra Capital Holdings, Inc., Con Edison Transmission, Inc., WGL Midstream; and RGC Midstream, LLC. Biden canceled the Keystone XL pipeline shortly after becoming president, resulting in TC Energy filing a $15BN lawsuit against the US. The Administration is getting the results its energy policies deserve, and the industry’s capex discipline is a result of prior poor returns as well as the long term hostility of Democrats to reliable energy. See I Can’t Go For That (No Can Do) – Why U.S. E&Ps Have Been Slow To Ramp Up Crude Oil Production for further detail.

 

  1. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the consequent sanctions have disrupted many commodity markets. Corn, wheat, fertilizer and steel are all sharply higher. No matter how the war plays out, Russia’s standing as a reliable supplier has been set back decades. Soviet troops violently suppressed protests in Budapest (1956) and Prague (1968), events that colored the west’s perspective of the Soviet Union until its fall in the early 1990s. Today’s war on Ukraine is much bigger and bloodier. Germany has led western Europe in belatedly correcting a posture of supplicant that relied on Russia for oil and gas and America for security. Many countries will regard Russia’s exports of commodities as permanently at risk to unpredictable military moves by the Kremlin, with prices higher as a result.

 

  1. Globalization has been an important source of disinflation for over three decades, allowing OECD economies to benefit from cheap Asian labor. Covid had already exposed supply chains to lockdowns overseas. Sanctions imposed on Russia will cause a further reassessment of suppliers and investments in other countries at risk of invading their neighbors. China and Taiwan is an obvious case. To put it in terms a CFO might consider, even 95% confidence that China won’t invade Taiwan in the next year translates into a 40% probability they will over a decade, resulting in a possible write off of any Chinese assets. This type of risk reassessment runs counter to globalization. Blackrock’s Larry Fink and Oaktree’s Howard Marks have both warned of a fundamental reordering of supply chains. “Cheapest” may lose to “most secure”, which will be closer to home or even domestic. This is inflationary.

 

 

  1. The energy transition is fundamentally inflationary, since it means paying more for the same amount of energy. This receives scant attention in the media which breathlessly reports on falling prices for solar panels and windmills. Obviously renewables cost more – otherwise they would dominate. Germany and California, both farther ahead in renewables use than most, have high electricity prices. Accepting more expensive energy is a legitimate public policy to lower emissions. In spite of the shrill climate extremists, coal-to-natgas switching, carbon capture and increased nuclear power are gaining support as more pragmatic solutions than weather-dependent ones. But reducing emissions is raising prices.

 

  1. Federal debt is on track to exceed the levels of World War II as a percentage of GDP. Treasury secretary Yellen has said that current levels of debt are sustainable but not the trajectory. Negative real yields on US treasuries are a persistent gift from return-insensitive buyers such as central banks, sovereign wealth funds and pension funds. They are facilitating our fiscal profligacy. But the US economy’s ability to tolerate rising rates has been decreasing with each cycle. Monetary policy is constrained because it effects the cost of financing our debt.

 

When wages rise faster than productivity, that provides an easy justification for the Fed to tighten policy. But the other factors listed above are less clearly in need of a hawkish response. Sanctions on Russia, de-globalization and policy choices to pay more for lower-emission power are all inflationary but do they really justify the Fed to counter them by slowing economic growth? This is the debate that will be occupying the FOMC during the current rate cycle.

If the Fed does overshoot, expect more $TNs of inflationary fiscal stimulus and Fed debt monetization via balance sheet expansion, because that’s how we combat recessions nowadays. We dislike recessions more than inflation, so the latter is more likely. Getting inflation back to 4% will calm their critics, such as Larry Summers who’s been as right as the FOMC has been wrong. But the Fed’s reinterpreted dual mandate along with fundamental shifts in world energy markets and trade flows make it likely we’ll adapt to permanently higher inflation than in the past 30 years.

We have three funds that seek to profit from this environment:

Energy Mutual Fund Energy ETF Inflation Fund

Please see important Legal Disclosures.

NextDecade Sees A Bright Future

Most US energy investors are familiar with Cheniere, America’s leading exporter of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG). Founded in 1996, the company was originally dedicated to increasing domestic supply, first as an oil & gas exploration business and then as an LNG importing company, which looked unlikely to keep up with growing demand. The Shale Revolution turned America into an exporter of cheap natural gas. Cheniere pivoted from importing to exporting, and currently ships just under half the LNG that leaves US facilities.

Natural gas is much trickier to move than oil or coal. Unless it’s traveling through a pipeline it has to be cooled and compressed. LNG export facilities cool methane and reduce it to 1/600th of its volume, while regasification plants at the receiving end warm it up for use by customers.

Not surprisingly, LNG facilities take years to construct. This makes it possible to project US export capacity out several years, based on existing projects either under construction or approaching Final Investment Decision (FID).

NextDecade was founded in 2010 by Kathleen Eisbrenner who took the company public in 2017 before retiring a year later. Their journey to building an LNG export facility has been long. In 2020 French utility Engie ended negotiations to become an anchor buyer due to concerns about flaring and methane leaks associated with US natural gas production.

This prompted NEXT to reposition themselves as a supplier of responsibly sourced gas that is chilled and compressed via a zero-emissions process. They even created a new division, Next Carbon Solutions, to lead this effort and explore selling their carbon capture expertise to other companies.

Data from the International Energy Agency (IEA) suggests that US exports of LNG have done more to reduce global CO2 emissions than any other project, including Germany’s drive into renewables (“Energiewende”). Last year the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) noted switching from coal to natural gas was the biggest driver of reduced CO2 emissions, a fact ignored by climate extremists.

Global coal consumption continues to increase, largely in emerging economies. Switching to natural gas for power generation remains the world’s most realistic hope for emissions reductions.

The outlook for US natural gas, already positive, received a further boost when Russia invaded Ukraine (see Russia Boosts US Energy Sector). Within days Germany had acknowledged its strategic error in relying so heavily on Russia for natural gas. Two new LNG import facilities are now planned on Germany’s north coast, and construction is expected to be fast-tracked. They are negotiating a long-term purchase agreement with Qatar.

Markets were quick to anticipate what Europe’s abrupt shift in energy policy means for US natural gas. Since February 1, Cheniere is 20% ahead of the S&P500 and 10% ahead of the American Energy Independence Index (AEITR). NextDecade and Tellurian, another company planning to export LNG, have both rallied over 60%. The odds of these two obtaining the necessary financing have improved sharply.

We had an opportunity to talk with Michael Mott, Senior VP, Next Carbon Solutions. Michael described a process that will capture up to 90% of the CO2 involved in LNG – both the pre-combustion when CO2 and other impurities are separated from the methane, and the CO2 emissions generated from energy use in chilling the methane for loading and transportation as LNG. He believes this will be the world’s first LNG facility that uses Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS), resulting in the “greenest LNG in the world.” NCS is planning to market its technology for capturing CO2 from the combustion of natural gas to others.

NextDecade’s Rio Grande site where they plan to build trains 1 and 2 of their LNG facility has all the necessary permits in place and is “shovel-ready”. They expect to secure financing to allow FID in 2H22. The war in Ukraine has added urgency to potential LNG buyers to secure supplies. Mott described the current market as the “strongest I’ve ever seen” and noted that analysts were still only belatedly catching up with how tight supply conditions will be in the years ahead.

NextDecade is taking a traditional approach to pricing, in that contracts are typically linked to the Henry Hub or a Brent crude-related benchmark and where NextDecade earns a set margin. This is similar to Cheniere’s approach, and by reducing NextDecade’s direct commodity price risk it makes securing financing easier.

FERC recently included resulting emissions as an additional factor they consider in approving pipeline projects. This is controversial to many in the industry – Kinder Morgan and Enbridge have both publicly criticized FERC’s changed posture. Mott believes this is an increasing trend, and that NextDecade is positioning itself to offer solutions.

The failed Build Back Better legislation included increased 45Q tax credits for CCS, and many expect this element to ultimately be passed. Mott said the industry believes a carbon price of at least $100 is necessary to incentivize investment and thinks that will eventually become a reality with direct payments being preferred over tax credits. CCS could eventually become a big source of growth for the pipeline sector.

NextDecade is a company worth watching. For the full version of our conversation with Michael Mott, check out our next podcast.

We have three funds that seek to profit from this environment:

Energy Mutual Fund Energy ETF Inflation Fund

Please see important Legal Disclosures.

Interest Rates Are Interesting Again

It must have been a lively FOMC meeting last week. The Fed has obviously committed their biggest mistake in living memory, and they finally started to normalize short term rates. They’re a year late, to the evident frustration of James Bullard who dissented on the 0.25% increase because he preferred 0.50%.

The FOMC revised up their forecasts of short term rates (the “dot plot”) by 1% over the next couple of years. They’re also now projecting they’ll need to raise rates above neutral before reducing them. In this respect they are belatedly confirming the forecast of the eurodollar futures market, although yields overall rose in response to the hawkish tone of the meeting.

Interest rates are interesting once more, after endless years of tedium. In 2008 the CME introduced half-tick increments to create the illusion of greater movement, and even quarter tick on near contracts. But for this blogger who traded interest rates in the 80s and 90s, the last 20+ years have been mostly glacial. Now once more there’s plenty to consider.

Although today’s high inflation is partly due to the Fed misinterpreting deep-seated as transitory, it’s also a consequence of their increased tolerance for elevated inflation in order to maximize employment. Any setback in employment will create a dilemma. Fed chair Jay Powell has argued that stable inflation is necessary to promote maximum employment over the long run. This central bank orthodoxy may sit less comfortably with some FOMC members given their bias towards making sure everyone has a job. Powell is presumably roughly in the middle of his FOMC’s range of views. The Administration is unlikely to add any hawks, especially with a presidential election in 2024.

When the first sign of economic weakness appears, the FOMC will need to assess whether it’s evidence that tighter policy is already doing its job. In recent tightening cycles the economy has succumbed at successively lower peaks. Somewhere on the way from 1% to 2% some self-doubt may intrude.

The matter is further complicated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is disingenuous for Biden to refer to “Putin’s gas hikes” since the global supply of oil and gas were already impeded by greatly reduced capex. The independent voter likely understands that promises to phase out fossil fuels, along with canceling the Keystone XL pipeline, were hardly intended to encourage more output.

Rising prices for wheat, corn and numerous other commodities exported by Russia and Ukraine can be more properly traced to Putin, but those haven’t yet captured consumers’ attention. It’s a boon for US farmers, although don’t expect to hear any suggestion of a windfall profits tax on agriculture.

The Fed’s next challenge will be to interpret which elements of inflation they should care about. Traditionally they’ve worried most about wage inflation. Higher commodity prices represent a wealth transfer and, to the extent that wealth flows outside of the US, a drag on GDP. Pre-Ukraine, higher oil was caused by Covid recovery, the $1.9TN American Recovery Act of early 2021 and energy sector financial discipline. The first two warranted a monetary response. The more recent and broad based jump in commodity prices is down to Russia and the west’s reaction. This is contractionary, in some respects achieving the same goal as higher short term rates.

The path of sequential tightening described by Powell and reflected in the yield curve is vulnerable to being shaken by signs of weakness. Some FOMC members, smarting from the previous error, will be inclined to press on. Strong advocates of favoring maximum employment over inflation will want to pause. The yield curve will shift.

The range of FOMC rate forecasts widened at last week’s meeting compared with December. This is especially evident over the next couple of years. The range of forecasts for the end of this year has widened to 2% from 1%, and for 2023 to 1.5% from 1%. Just as forecasting next month’s return on stocks is harder than next decade’s, so it is with interest rates. The most dovish 2023 forecast is 2.25%, equal to where the three hawks were in December.

This suggests a wide range of views, and therefore uncertainty on what the correct rate path should be.

For investors, it makes interest rate volatility more likely as FOMC members navigate an especially difficult environment. It means the inversion in the yield curve 2023-24 could vanish if economic weakness leads to even a slightly slower pace of tightening. And it means inflation is unlikely to return to 2% for years.

We have three funds that seek to profit from this environment:

Energy Mutual Fund Energy ETF Inflation Fund

Please see important Legal Disclosures.

Are Pipelines Still Cheap?

Investors have endured several body blows this year. Inflation was already rising due to the strong rebound from Covid exacerbated by last year’s $1.9TN Covid relief spending. The long heralded and late removal of excessive monetary accommodation is about to start.

More recently, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has abruptly upended decades of western engagement, ushering in sanctions, European rearmament and urgent diversification of energy supplies. As if this isn’t enough, China placed the 17.5 million residents of Shenzhen into lockdown after new virus cases doubled nationwide to almost 3,400. The rest of the world has resigned itself to living with Covid – China’s lone insistence on complete suppression seems futile but not yet abandoned.

There’s no shortage of articles, some quite thoughtful, on Russia’s invasion and its consequences. The Weakness of the Despot is an interview with historian Stephen Kotkin who has written two volumes on Stalin (he’s working on a third). Kotkin argues that Russia’s history repeatedly shows “its capabilities have never matched its aspirations” as a great power. In Possible Outcomes of the Russo-Ukrainian War and China’s Choice a Chinese academic argues that once it becomes clear Russia has blundered, Chinese interests will draw them back towards economically successful western nations, cooling relations with Russia.

Tempting as it is to become an expert on wars and geopolitics, the more useful insight we can offer is that Russia’s estrangement from most of the world is going to last years if not decades. We can be more confident on this forecast than the conflict itself or China’s next moves, because the fact and manner of Russia’s invasion can’t be undone.

For example, Christopher Smart, chief global strategist and head of the Barings Investment Institute, said “Until you have a new leader in Russia, one who apologizes for invading Ukraine and who writes a check for reparations, these sanctions are going to remain in place. And I don’t see any of the three things I just described happening.”

Some predict that Russia’s economy will be set back thirty years. The global oil giants were only the first in a long line of western companies to announce the exit or abandonment of their Russian operations. So far more than 300 of the world’s best known brands have announced plans to leave. The port of Hamburg reports that container traffic with Russia is “approaching zero,” compared with “hundreds of thousands annually” before the invasion.

CNBC noted that, “none of the experts who spoke to CNBC for this story believe that any of the current sanctions against Russia or Belarus are going to be eased or lifted for at least the next three years.”

As upwards of 300 companies deal with messy exits and the inevitable write downs, corporate memories will be scarred.

The change in trade flows as much of the world turns away from imports of Russian oil, gas and wheat represents as significant a change as we can recall to the world economy. The recent drop in crude oil was caused by the Chinese reminder that Covid remains with us, even if they’re alone in still trying to wipe it out. The rest of the world has moved on. “Remask between bites and sips,” the offensive demand on US commercial airlines to constantly adjust facegear while eating and drinking, is redundant and virtually the only restriction left while the CDC takes yet another month to review its policy for public transport. Bites and sips. Ugh.

After the kind of run the energy sector has had, it’s reasonable to ask if it’s still cheap. On an Enterprise Value/EBITDA (EV/EBITDA) basis midstream is still well below its long term average. If the current 10X EV/EBITDA re-rated to 12X, assuming 50/50 debt/equity that would mean a 40% price increase from here. For several years the fear that the energy transition would lead to the early retirement of pipelines weighed on the sector, lowering terminal values. As it becomes increasingly clear that this transition, like those before it (wood to coal, coal to oil/gas) will take decades, equity investors should adopt the more realistic assessment that bond investors in the sector have always retained (see Pipeline Bond Investors Are More Bullish Than Equity Buyers).

The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecasts continued growth in production of natural gas, crude oil and renewable power through 2050. Few have noticed that since 2017 the EIA has revised up its forecast long term output of natural gas nearly as much as renewable power. Crude oil has been revised up even further. The renewables increase matches the reduction in coal output. The numbers tell a different story than much of the liberal media.

Wells Fargo estimates that adding ten years to the expected economic life of midstream infrastructure provides a 1.0X uplift in EV/EBITDA, which we estimate is worth 20% on equity prices.

Moreover, the energy sector’s weighting in the S&P500 has almost doubled from its low of 2.1% reached in 2020. As it recovers, the cost of an underweight becomes more significant, something abundantly clear to investors so far this year. There are anecdotal reports of generalist investors adding to energy exposure.

The sector still has a long recovery ahead of it.

We have three funds that seek to profit from this environment:

Energy Mutual Fund Energy ETF Inflation Fund

Please see important Legal Disclosures.

 

How Far Will The Fed Go?

Next week the Fed Funds rate is expected to be raised, for the first time in over three years. Pundits love to say the Federal Reserve is “in a corner”, implying a Hobson’s Choice between possible courses of action. This hackneyed term is being deployed again, mischaracterizing their choices.

It’s true inflation expectations have edged up – five years implied CPI is 3.4%, and ten years 2.9%. But these figures aren’t that bad – if inflation runs at 7% this year, falls to 4% next year and then returns to the Fed’s 2% long term target, that would be consistent with the 3.4% average implied by the treasury market. Moreover, the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) deflator which is the Fed’s chosen metric typically runs 0.25% or so below CPI. Although inflation is 7.9%, the FOMC can interpret long-run expectations as well contained.

Higher crude oil is both a constraint on consumer spending and a boost to inflation. These factors prescribe opposite pressures on monetary policy – higher oil works like a tax hike without the corresponding improvement in our fiscal balance. Leaning hard against current inflation makes less sense when energy prices are already tempering disposable incomes.

The justification for monetary accommodation receded long ago, and the FOMC will want to get back to neutral probably at the pace implied by eurodollar futures – reaching 2% in a year or so.

The interesting question is in which direction is this forecast vulnerable? Goldman Sachs puts the odds of a recession by next year at 20-35%, which they calculate is the odds implied by the yield curve. The market’s priced for the Fed to modestly over-tighten by the end of next year, causing them to reverse course.

The bond market is being tugged between these two opposing forces – increased odds of recession and rising inflation.

Although crude oil fell last week, the supply shock to a broad range of commodities caused by Russia’s invasion looks set to persist. It’s hard to envisage a scenario in Ukraine that will restore Russia’s trading links with much of the world. Regardless of the military outcome, diversity of supply is now a pillar of European energy security and probably food security too.

As commodity prices continue to reflect tight markets, recession odds and inflation will both increase.

For an FOMC attuned to “transitory” explanations for elevated inflation, there is a long list of candidates, even if chair Jay Powell has officially retired the adjective. Supply constraints as consumption of goods rebounded faster than services was the original one. Putin’s gas price hike is another that White House press secretary Jenn Psaki has coined. Tighter monetary policy isn’t much help there.

The energy transition is inflationary – properly executed it means energy will cost more without doing more. Administration policy has been to discourage new supply of traditional energy, which was already pushing prices higher before Putin provided another shove. If Russia’s isolation from global trade continues for many months, which seems likely, this will dominate the narrative around energy inflation.

Then there’s Owners’ Equivalent Rent (OER), the deeply flawed estimate of the cost of shelter based on survey responses measuring what homeowners think they could rent their house for (see Why You Shouldn’t Expect A Return To 2% Inflation). This metric lagged the strong housing market that followed Covid, providing the BLS economists who publish it and the FOMC to ignore what American home buyers experienced.

OER does tend to track the Case Shiller index over the long run, and has recently been trending higher (+4.3% year-on-year). Surveyed homeowners are belatedly reflecting the strong housing market by demanding more theoretical rent from their hypothetical tenants. Having ignored the housing market, as OER pushed up measured inflation the FOMC could dismiss it as a non-cash expense. It would be bizarre for monetary policy to be influenced by OER – it never has been. Housing bubbles have never induced higher short term rates, and there’s no reason to expect OER to either.

OER is another item on the list of inflation that can be tolerated. Having dropped “transitory” look out for “ephemeral” or “impermanent” as replacement adjectives.

The yield curve can be interpreted as the market’s way of grading the Fed. Too steep suggests they’re allowing too much inflation. Inversion suggests policy is too tight. They want to get back to neutral, which is 2.5% although 2% would be close enough. Given this FOMC’s full employment bias and inflation risk tolerance, we’re only ever one weak payroll report away from the market repricing to a slower pace of policy normalization.

Eurodollar futures suggest a cycle peak late next year. The impact of Russia’s invasion has been to shift the neutral rate higher and increase the odds of an overshoot. If the FOMC ever finds themselves contemplating a rate hike when the market is priced for it to be their last, many members will be find reasons to demur. This is why ten year inflation expectations should continue moving up. Portfolios should be structured accordingly.

We have three funds that seek to profit from this environment:

Energy Mutual Fund Energy ETF Inflation Fund

Please see important Legal Disclosures.

 

Natural Gas To Remain Top Energy Source For Decades

Last week the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) published their 2022 Annual Energy Outlook. Solar and wind output are expected to grow at 4% pa, reaching 12% of our total energy production by 2050, triple their share today. This is an impressive growth rate, although less than the media coverage of renewables would suggest. It’s higher than in the EIA’s 2017 annual outlook, which looked for solar and wind to have a 9% market share by 2050.

In other revisions, the EIA has also boosted its forecast of natural gas production, which is now expected to grow by 8 Quadrillion BTUs (QBTUs). This puts 2050 production at the equivalent of 121 Billion Cubic Feet per day (BCF/D) versus a forecast of 89 BCF/D for 2022.

Many will be surprised to learn that the energy equivalent increase in natural gas production through 2050 is close to the increase from solar and wind (9 QBTUs). This reflects cheap natural gas, the slow pace of energy transitions and continued growth in domestic energy consumption, which is expected to increase by 7 QBTUs, from 99 to 106. In effect solar and wind will do a little more than cover increased demand.

Another surprise will be the revisions to crude oil production. Over the past five years, the EIA has boosted its 2050 forecast of US oil production by the equivalent of almost 3 million barrels per day. This is more than revisions to solar/wind, or natural gas. Coal is the one area where they’ve lowered expected production.

There are other surprising trends. The non-fossil fuel share of electricity production is expected to increase relatively slowly through 2050, from 42% to 58%. This adds back hydropower and nuclear, both sectors unlikely to grow much. The best locations for hydropower were identified and used long ago, while nuclear plants face debilitating opposition. There are signs climate extremists in Europe are becoming more amenable to nuclear, a welcome sign of pragmatism versus the purist view that requires running everything with solar and windmills.

The natural gas share of power generation is not expected to change much – from 30% to 29%. Coal will absorb most of the losses, representing the most realistic path to reducing emissions. By contrast, Germany recently brought forward the deadline by which they plan to reach 100% renewable power, from 2040 to 2035. The US is on track to reach 56% by then after which little change is forecast.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has suddenly made Europeans more aware of energy security. Renewable power is almost always domestic, so increasing this makes sense on top of buying more LNG from other countries including the US. But so far Germany’s headlong rush towards windpower hasn’t been something to emulate. We’re fortunate that the US isn’t moving at the same speed. It would only serve to accommodate China’s persistently increasing emissions. Russia isn’t helping much either.

The EIA’s outlook on emissions shows generally steady state for the next three decades – a slight dip through 2035 followed by a modest increase. High oil prices and slower growth might cause a bigger reduction  – a combination we are likely to experience based on recent events. But until voters accept higher-priced energy as necessary to reduce emissions, we’re unlikely to see much change.

Neither political party has offered appealing solutions – Progressives implausibly want the whole world to run on solar and windmills. Conservatives see little appetite among voters to pay more to reduce emissions. US states play a big role, which has led to more modest steps reflecting popular ambivalence on the issue.

That contrasts with the Administration’s stated goal of cutting CO2 emissions in half by 2030, although they haven’t yet provided any details on how they plan to do that. The infrastructure bill that recently passed included $8BN in funding to establish four hydrogen hubs, which would enable greater use of the clean-burning fuel by the power and industrial sectors. Hydrogen is 2-3X the price of US natural gas, but the right economic incentives would boost its role. The EIA projects almost no hydrogen use even by 2050. Europe is farther ahead because natural gas prices before the Ukraine war made it competitive.

The EIA annual outlook reminds that US natural gas output has a bright future, likely to grow for decades. It’s why we invest in the sector – the economics are more attractive than renewables, helped by the widely-held erroneous belief that fossil fuels are going away. Over the past five years the EIA has revised fossil fuel production up by more than renewables. Europe’s sudden realization that they need to import more LNG isn’t factored into the EIA’s report, prepared as it was before Russia’s invasion.

Investors are starting to recalibrate their expectations, like the EIA.

We have three funds that seek to profit from this environment:

Energy Mutual Fund Energy ETF Inflation Fund

Please see important Legal Disclosures.

 

 

 

Russia Boosts Inflation

Had Jay Powell and the FOMC prudently begun reducing the economy’s degree of monetary support a year ago when the Covid vaccine was already being administered, they’d have more flexibility to manage the economy’s current challenges. From a 2% neutral rate and with the balance sheet shrinking, they’d be able to pivot towards easing or further tightening depending on circumstances. Because of that policy error they’re now having to get back to neutral during high economic uncertainty.

Hence eurodollar futures are anticipating a follow-up error to last year’s which is excessive tightening by the end of next year which then has to reverse in 2024, an election year. Some FOMC members must regret having followed such a reactive strategy.

The good news for the Fed in Friday’s payroll report was a small increase in the participation rate and flat earnings growth – although changes in the composition of the workforce make month-to-month comparisons difficult.

Higher energy prices will constrain growth in the months ahead, while also boosting inflation. Food prices are also likely to rise. Russia is almost 20% of gobal wheat exports, and Ukraine 10%. Fertilizer prices will probably also rise.

Inflation ex-food and energy won’t look as bad, although some of this will pass through via higher transportation costs. The Fed will want to control the inflation that’s caused by excess demand while looking beyond the transitory effects of supply constraints now exacerbated by Russia’s invasion.

The futures market reflects some risk that the FOMC will fail to judge correctly. Ten year inflation expectations derived from the treasury market edged up 0.25% over the past month. Since higher energy and commodity prices will constrain growth while boosting prices, the Fed will likely have to tolerate higher inflation for longer than they would like. With the FOMC biased towards maximizing employment at the possible risk of higher inflation, signs of economic weakness ought to moderate their path to normalization of policy.

Financial markets are pricing for slower growth with higher inflation, what became known in the 1970s as “stagflation”. Fortunately, persistently negative real yields are softening the blow by allowing nominal rates to stay lower than they would otherwise be. Next time you run into the trustee of a public pension fund, thank them for unthinkingly financing America’s growing indebtedness for no real return.

On crude oil, the Administration’s anti-fossil fuel posture is translating into higher prices. White House press secretary Jen Psaki responded to a reporter that oil companies should increase production. Meanwhile, members of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) were justifying their recent decision to consider climate change when approving new natural gas pipelines. Senator Joe Manchin (D-W.Va) accused FERC of, “setting in motion a process that will serve to further shut down the infrastructure we desperately need as a country and further politicize energy development in our country.”

Chevron’s CEO Mike Wirth has called for “long-term commitments to support investment in America’s domestic oil industry.” Administration policy has been to dissuade domestic oil and gas production, a strategy that has been a disaster for US consumers. Energy executives understandably see little point in major capital commitments given the Federal government’s stance. It represents a collision between proponents of an overly rapid energy transition and energy security.

Russia is already having trouble finding buyers for its oil, with Shell reporting a transaction on Friday at a $28.50 discount to the Brent benchmark. JPMorgan estimates that 70% of Russian crude exports are struggling to find buyers. Political support is growing for banning US imports of Russian oil, a move the White House probably regards as a trap since it would quickly be followed by calls to support increased US production.

The Administration is unlikely to shift their energy policy before the mid-terms, which means US consumers shouldn’t expect much relief from high prices.

The outlook for US midstream energy infrastructure is unambiguously good. Large new pipeline projects are almost impossible to complete, so free cash flow continues to grow because spending on new projects remains a third of its 2018 level. And no matter how the conflict in Ukraine plays out Europe will be less reliant on Russia for its energy supplies.

Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) export facilities take years to build. Williams Companies anticipates strong export-led demand for natural gas through their pipeline network.

Amidst considerable uncertainty, prolonged inflation well above the Fed’s target and robust demand for US natural gas both seem likely.

We have three funds that seek to profit from this environment:

Energy Mutual Fund Energy ETF Inflation Fund

Please see important Legal Disclosures.

 

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