Drilling Down on Oil Production Details

It’s always interesting digging into the details of what’s happening with oil and gas production. Often there’s useful information provided by the companies themselves. Baker Hughes (BHI) for example publishes a global rig count every month. It covers most oil producing regions, and shows that the global rig count (counting those in use) has barely changed from the Summer. The average for 2014 was 3,578 and December’s figure was 3,570. So far, on a global level, rig use is not down much, although in their earnings call this morning  BHI did warn that operating conditions would be challenging this year because of the drop in oil. Incidental, the U.S. and Canada represent a big chunk of the global. Together, they closed the year at 2,257 rigs so 63% of the global total and slightly above the 2014 average but down 4% from November.

What did jump out at us though was the increase in use in some Middle Eastern countries. Saudi Arabia has been increasing all year, from 89 in January 2014 to 115 in December. The UAE similarly went from 28 to 36. So far, these countries don’t look as if they’re cutting back, as indeed the Saudis regularly remind us.

Another small but interesting nugget came from the Halliburton (HAL) call. They noted that the volume of sand used in fracking was +46% in 4Q14 compared with a year ago. This is consistent with comments from U.S. Silica (SLCA), that more mature wells use greater volumes of sand to maximize production. We think SLCA is attractively priced at current levels, and the indications we see are that their business of providing fracking sand is less vulnerable to falling oil prices than some may think. We are not invested in BHI or HAL.

 

Some Investors Dodge a Bullet

Winston Churchill has been quoted as once saying, “There’s nothing more exhilarating than to be shot at and missed.” Such must be the feeling of investors today who found recently they had rather more exposure to falling crude oil prices than previously thought. Chevron just announced  the indefinite suspension of a project in the Canadian Arctic, an unsurprising response to lower oil prices. Some of the most expensive fields are offshore, and the impact is being felt squarely by companies such as Transocean (RIG), down 62% YTD, and Noble Corp (NE), down 48% YTD.

Investors lightening up on energy exposure are in many cases selling everything in that sector, often by lightening up on an ETF. So the S&P Energy ETF XLE is down 32% YTD including companies like Kinder Morgan (KMI) and Williams (WMB) with their predominantly fee-based business models.

It further occurred to me that the historic linkage between lower oil and slower economic activity may well be provoking many risk models to quantify investments in cyclical companies as more risky than before. Crude oil usually falls in price as economic activity weakens, but rarely causes such absent other factors. A historically high correlation between crude oil and GDP may well be influencing quantitative measures of risk in spite of the generally positive impact on GDP. Unfortunately there is no data available to support this so it’s really just a supposition on my part, but seems quite plausible to me.

Meanwhile, stocks such as truck manufacturer Navistar (NAV) and Hertz (HTZ) which can surely only benefit from lower gasoline prices notwithstanding their recent weakness are both benefiting from Carl Icahn adding to his holdings.

Health Care Versus Energy Within the S&P500

The chart below shows the performance of different sectors of the equity market so far this year. Of course, there are always sectors that are outperforming, so nothing much new there. However, if in general as an investor you don’t commit much to health care and you are overweight energy, recent months have likely given you reason to examine comparative performance rather more closely, as we have. If in addition you’ve had a couple of small positions in smaller energy names, you’ve also experienced first hand the relative underperformance of small cap stocks versus the market. Suffice it to say that the results of owning a handful of large health care stocks and being short a smattering of small energy stocks would have been about as perfect a position to hold over the last three months.

"EnergyThe chart tells the story, but to put numbers on it, while the S&P500 is +14% this year, Healthcare (defined as XLV, the sector ETF) has returned almost double at +27% while Energy is -19%. A good portion of the Health Care/Energy relative performance has occurred just in the past three months (28%). Interestingly, the daily returns of MLPs have been most highly correlated with Energy (64%), even though MLPs have outperformed Energy by a whopping 19.5%. In fact, at +11% for the year the performance of MLPs is not far short of the S&P500.  What’s happened is that bigger than typical daily falls in Energy spill over to MLPs even though midstream energy infrastructure (what most MLPs are engaged in) has a very different risk profile from Exploration and Production. So on days when XLE fell 1%, the correlation with MLPs was higher than normal, at 76%. MLPs react to sudden moves, but on the days when Energy is not down 1% or more (84% of the time this year) they react to their own economics.

So what does one conclude? The surprise of the past 2-3 years has been that ACA (The Affordable Care Act, or “Obamacare”) has been very good for the health care sector. I doubt many architects of that legislation expected to create such wealth for health care providers. However, the major news story of 2014 is clearly Oil. Small energy sector servicers have been extremely weak, while the economics for many energy infrastructure businesses have remained sound notwithstanding big drops in some of their customers’ stock prices. Friday was such a day. with the Energy sector -6.3% and MLPs -5.3%. There are substantial crosscurrents beneath the simply headline result of the S&P500.

 

Continental Resources Exploits the Optionality in Its Portfolio

Harold Hamm, CEO of Continental Resources (CLR), has most recently been in the news because of his $995 million divorce settlement, which his wife is appealing. Far more interesting though, was Continental’s recent decision to remove all of its hedges on future oil production. Closing out the short positions in oil futures generated a one-time $433 million gain, while of course also leaving the company exposed to further drops in oil prices. However, CLR also cut back its planned 2015 capex budget from $5.2 billion to $4.6 billion. This highlighted the optionality that E&P companies possess, in that within limits they can decide not to produce oil from certain fields if prices aren’t sufficiently attractive. In those cases, rather than being long oil they have a position that looks more like a long call option on oil. As option traders will readily recognize, a long oil call option combined with a short oil position (through the hedges they had) creates a long put option on oil. In effect, CLR’s ownership of oil producing assets combined with its hedges has acted in part like a put option on oil. Harold Hamm said that they believe oil has to rise in price, and that’s a good enough reason to remove the hedges. But if they’re wrong, they can at least mitigate the situation by producing less. If you’re long options, a volatile market is usually good (it increases the potential value of your position). CLR is making full use of the volatility in oil by trading their effective long put option on oil. Harold Hamm’s divorce reminded me of someone who was just going through his third. Harold probably won’t see the humor in this at present, but this serial divorcer I’m thinking of had names for his three ex-wives: Half, Quarter and Eighth, denoting approximately what he was left with following each event in the unfortunate sequence.

Why Offshore Oil Producers Will Likely Be the First to Cut Output

There has been plenty of concern recently that the drop in oil prices would cause many domestic E&P names in the U.S. to curtail their activities at marginal plays. This in turn would have a knock-on effect on oil servicers and the MLPs that manage and build energy infrastructure needed to exploit America’s shale boom. Several MLPs recently commented that they felt current oil prices wouldn’t have much impact on U.S. production. For example, Enterprise Products’ (EPD) CEO Michael Creel said, “Our analysis shows that most if not all of the core drilling area in key oil plays such as the Eagle Ford, Permian and Bakken are profitable at numbers below where we are today and U.S. drilling is certainly not grinding to a hault.”

In fact, the marginal producer of crude oil looks very much like an offshore producer.

Transocean (RIG) is an industry leader in the ownership and operation of offshore drilling rigs. In their quarterly earnings call this morning, CEO Steve Newman said,

“The market pause we began discussing with you more than a year ago has evolved into a cyclical downturn. Although our customers take a decidedly long-term view in making investment decisions, the approximately 27% decline in oil prices observed over the last three months is likely to increase their challenge to improve short-term returns to their shareholders.

In turn, this may temporarily exacerbate the offshore rig supply and balance that has already resulted in dayrate and utilization pressures and an increase in the inter-contract idle time in stacking of rigs and potentially delay the cynical recovery.”

In addition, their just filed 10Q included the following:

GoodwillSubsequent to September 30, 2014, market conditions have continued to deteriorate, and we identified additional adverse trends, including continued declines of the market value of our stock and that of other industry participants, declines in oil and natural gas prices, the cancellation or suspension of drilling contracts, the permanent retirement of certain drilling units in the industry and increasingly unfavorable changes to actual and anticipated market conditions.  On that basis, in the three months ending December 31, 2014, we expect to reevaluate whether the fair value of our reporting unit has again fallen below its carrying amount, which could result in us recognizing additional, potentially significant, losses on impairment of goodwill.

So while lower oil prices may well hurt providers of services and infrastructure globally, it looks as if the most immediate pain is being felt in areas away from U.S. shale plays.

 

As Bad as IBM's Been, Amazon's Been Worse

About a year ago our newsletter compared the valuation of IBM and Amazon (AMZN). At the time IBM had a P/E of 10X (AMZN’s was 166X), was growing Free Cash Flow (versus flat at AMZN) and seemed wholly more attractively priced than AMZN. As we noted then, we owned IBM and not AMZN, where  we think that being a customer is so much better than being an owner.

A year later, IBM has so far been a disappointment. Its most recent quarterly earnings saw continued weak sales, an abandonment of their long-held 2015 forecast of $20 in EPS,  and a payment of $1.5 billion to a firm kind enough to take their loss-making chip manufacturing business off their hands. From November 1, 2013 through today IBM has returned -7% (including dividends), substantially worse than the S&P500’s +13.5% total return over the same period.

It’s hard to compare the P/E they were trading at last year with their current level, because for now management isn’t making a 2015 earnings forecast. However, using consensus estimates of $16.91, it’s trading at less than last year’s 10X multiple that we found attractive. The critics point to the challenge of adapting their business model to cloud-based software as a service and away from their licensing model. So far events seems to agree with them. And yet, the company continues to generate $12-14 billion of free cashflow, some of which buys back stock which helps its per share metrics. We were obviously early with IBM, but are staying the course.

Although it’s hard to believe, owning AMZN for the past year would have been worse than the 20% relative underperformance delivered by IBM. AMZN CEO Jeff Bezos and his penchant for putting growth ahead of profits helped drive AMZN’s most recent quarterly earnings disappointment and is behind their -20% one year return, 33% worse than the S&P500. Bezos has always wanted to deliver profits sometime in the future. It’s why they’re such an exciting company to watch and why I buy all kinds of obscure items without having to set foot in a brick and mortar store. In the last several weeks I have bought beach shoes, a replacement license plate light bulb, batteries, leather luggage tags, a belt and several 1lb bags of shelled Brazil nuts. I love AMZN investors for helping keep the company’s cost of capital low so that they can offer all these products and millions of others.

Some people thought long AMZN/short IBM was a great pairs trade. Well, IBM certainly has been a worse investment than the S&P500, but handily better than AMZN. If you’re not leveraged, waiting for IBM to beat the benchmark as well isn’t that expensive.

The Dilemma of Hedging

Assuming you’re not the type of investor whose mood is synchronized with the daily gyrations of the stock market, October has been an interesting month. Although it’s not over yet so of course anything can happen, to this point October looks like a big, short-lived margin call. Leveraged investors and those who like to hedge their downside have had a torrid time and many must regard their recent activity wondering how so much frenetic portfolio adjusting could have been so harmful.

It will be especially interesting to see how hedge funds finish the month. Industry apologists long ago perfected shifting the goalposts of performance. What was once the Absolute Return industry moved to generating attractive relative returns, later supplanted by uncorrelated returns as each description of the performance objective was found to be at odds with the empirical results. Nowadays sophisticated hedge fund consultants promote downside protection as the raison d’etre of a hedge fund allocation.

So what to make of the way October is shaping up? Through yesterday, the S&P500 was down 1.6% for the month, an innocuous result that scarcely describes the wealth adjustment that was inflicted earlier. MLPs, in which we have more than a passing interest, were at one point down 14% before the V-shaped market move thankfully began its ascent.

Hedge funds, as defined by the HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index, are currently estimated to be down 2.5%. Many hedge funds, particularly those focused on equities,  have done far worse. Stocks may of course spend the rest of the month falling, but assuming they don’t one imagines there will be some uncomfortable conversations as investors contemplate the value destruction that’s possible when hedged strategies test the market timing skills of their practitioners beyond the level of their ability.

It’s a fair question to ask that, in a market environment characterized by a sharp trip down followed by an equally fast return, what exactly should a hedged strategy return? Presumably, if a hedge fund maintains constant exposure, the round trip ought not to be much different than for the long only investor. But it’s looking very much as if the risk management being practiced is of the “dynamic” variety, which is to say highly responsive to market moves, or perhaps less generously, prone to sell low and buy high.

It reminded me a little of the crash of October 1987, whose 27th anniversary of course just passed on Monday. Not nearly as traumatic of course, and spread over a longer period of days, but what both events have in common is the use of hedging strategies that rely on risk reduction in response to falling prices. In 1987 it was called Portfolio Insurance. Its 2014 version has more complexity and variety of implementation, but thematically is another version of taking more risk when prices are rising and less when they’re not. There are other ways to grow your savings.

 

 

 

Bulls Talk While Bears Sell

We’re in one of those periods of time in the market where participants are simply talking past one another. The fundamentally-driven bull case acknowledges that sharply lower oil prices are bad for E&P companies but notes that for the rest of the economy it’s like a tax cut. Power consumption just got cheaper. And yes, growth overseas is slowing, notably in the EU but also in China and Brazil. But the U.S. economy is doing fine. And finally, Ebola is in every conversation but the media hype and fear are magnitudes out of proportion to the actual incidence of infections.

Meanwhile, the sellers don’t engage in the debate on these issues at all, but simply keep selling. Not because they want to, but because they have to. In fact, it’s quite extraordinary that after all the losses and capital destruction that went on during the financial crisis in 2008, that there is still so much money invested on a seeming hair trigger. So many participants evidently  operate under a psychological margin call that induces them to sell when prices fall a certain amount, or indeed an actual one. Investing with leverage is generally not a smart way to grow your savings, but a lot of people obviously still do it in one form or another. Perhaps one of the most bearish items over the near term is that the bearish case is so rarely articulated. Most of what you can read or watch on TV seems to be another fundamentally driven bullish analysis.

Meanwhile, Kinder Morgan (KMI) reported after the close yesterday and reaffirmed their $2 dividend for 2015, 10% annual dividend growth and a backlog of projects up from $17 billion to $17.9 billion (even after dropping $1.1 billion into production, so $2 billion of projects were added). We think at $35 it’s a good investment. We also think Burger King (BKW) apparently a widely-owned hedge fund stock is starting to look attractive as its price is now retreating back towards its level prior to the merger announcement with Tim Horton (THI).

It ought to be a great opportunity for hedge funds to demonstrate their added value as uncorrelated investments that can dampen downside volatility, as opposed to showing that they are in fact over-capitalized. So far this year, the simple 60/40 S&P500 and Dow Jones Corporate Bond combination has returned +4.6% (through Tuesday) compared with the HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index (HFRX) of -1.6%, closing in on an incredible 12th straight year of underperforming the 60/40 alternative.

Navigating the New Volatility

Some market strategists had been warning of a market reversal, and had been telling us that low levels of volatility couldn’t continue. If you keep forecasting a market drop long enough you’ll be right. Even for those of us who don’t focus much attention on market timing and therefore ought not to care, it’s never pleasant watching the investments you like drop like a fridge hurled from a tenth story apartment.

So there’s no insight here on market direction, simply an update on what we’ve been doing; which is mostly re-examining what we own and not selling. The collapse in crude oil resembles what you’d find in a full-blown recession, and markets are evidently pricing in such at least for the Eurozone with slower growth in China and Brazil among others. Lower oil reflects recently revised forecasts of slower demand growth from the EIA as well as increasing U.S. output. MLPs reacted fully like energy stocks this week even though their energy infrastructure businesses have limited direct sensitivity to oil and gas prices and are more driven by volumes and growth prospects, both of which appear good and unchanged.

Nonetheless, the seeming one-way train that has been MLP prices abruptly changed. The sharp correction allowed us to make minor portfolio upgrades in certain strategies.  In recent days for our MLP Strategy we acquired a little more Plains GP Holdings (PAGP) which we like as the GP of Plains All America, and Markwest Energy Partners (MWE) an MLP with no GP to siphon away cashflows. We may add a little more PAGP on further weakness.

In our High Dividend Low Beta Strategy we added modestly to Spectra Energy (SE), a large pipeline operator whose stock price had dropped 15% from its recent high along with many other energy sector names. In our Low Beta Long Short (Best Ideas) for similar reasons, we bought Enbridge, selling Coke (KO) following its recent strength (surprisingly, some stocks have been rising) after Pepsi’s earnings report.

In Deep Value we added a small position in Monsanto (MON).

All of which is to say we are holding about 99% of the same positions we did at the beginning of the month, albeit at lower prices. Friday’s midday bounce in MLPs almost felt like a market recovery even though stocks overall had another poor day. Kinder Morgan (KMI), Berkshire Hathaway (BRK), Williams Companies (WMB), IBM and Hertz (HTZ) remain among our biggest holdings across strategies.

Interest rates remain low and look set to stay that way a good while longer. We have further minor portfolio upgrades in mind if the market continues its correction. Unlike most prognosticators, we won’t try and forecast it, but will simply be prepared.

 

With Options, Less Can Be More

This weekend the Striking Price column in Barron’s referred to the Options Industry Council’s educational series of videos. I have to say I have mixed feelings on the topic. On the positive side of course educating investors is a good thing. The videos currently available are extremely basic, offering definitions on terms such as “strike price” or “in the money”, but presumably there will be additional offerings that will explain how options can be used in various strategies.

The negative element is that the vast majority of individual investors really ought not to be using options at all. At their most basic, options introduce leverage and leverage makes the timing of an investment return far more important than it ought to be. Buying call options on a stock you think will rise will never be as profitable as buying the stock, if the stock rises. Buying put options to protect against a market fall is not as good as limiting your overall exposure to that which you can sustain through a market fall.

Options turn investors into traders, and while this is good for the options industry and for firms that make markets in options, transactions costs, taxes and missed opportunities will render long term returns lower than they would be otherwise. In short, for the majority it’s fair to say that the less time you spend on options the richer you’ll be. FINRA’s Investor Alerts page offers a lot of sensible advice, but including advice to focus on the long term term is probably a step too far.

For many years I ran an interest rate options trading business. Broadly speaking, market makers are more often sellers than buyers of options. It’s too much of a simplification to justify this bias by saying most options settle worthless, but the demand is heavier from those seeking protection (i.e. paying the option premium) than the reverse.

Warren Buffett made an interesting options investment some years ago (it was in long dated options with ten or more years to expiry; exceptionally far out and therefore an exception to the notion that options are usually for traders). In effect he bet that the Black-Scholes (B-S) formula  so often used to price options is flawed. B-S takes today’s security price and extends it out into the future at the risk free rate to estimate its future value. The volatility of the stock reflects the model’s confidence that the stock in question will be at that projected level when the option expires.

By selling long dated options priced this way, Buffett was acting on his conviction that projecting out today’s value for the S&P500 at the yield on the ten year treasury note (i.e. the risk free rate) understates the likely level of the S&P500 in ten years time. The B-S assumption allows for an elegant algebraic solution to the price, but in Buffett’s view the solution was wrong. So Berkshire sold put options on the S&P500 to B-S reliant options market makers, based on his insight that their models were assuming the future price of the S&P500 to be too low and therefore overvaluing the put options they were buying.

Berkshire had to stop adding such trades because of the possibility they’d have to post margin if the trades moved against them, which in an extreme case (i.e. very weak equity market) might have tied up more liquidity than was prudent to support their insurance business. The settlement dates extend into the next decade, so it’ll be many years before the result of those decisions is known. Berkshire’s 2013 10-K noted $2.8 billion in gains from equity index put option contracts whose fair value (i.e. what Berkshire owes at current prices) has dropped to $4.8 billion (excluding premium taken in).

However, I doubt the Options Industry Council will publish videos on how to trade options like Warren Buffett. Like alcohol, best used in moderation.

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