Recently we’ve initiated a short position in Japanese Yen in our Fixed Income Strategy. Some observers have been forecasting economic catastrophe for Japan and its currency for many years based on its poor demographics and steadily worsening fiscal situation. Kyle Bass is one of the better known Japan bears, and he has written eloquently about the problems he foresees. Timing has been frustrating the Japan bears for years, in fact for decades, in spite of the compelling case that Kyle Bass and others like him make. Shorting Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) is not a new idea.
So it is with a healthy respect for the unsatisfying history of such investments that we are cautiously venturing into this area. What makes this an interesting opportunity today is the presence of some optionality around events which could weaken the Yen.
Japan’s trade situation has been worsening in recent months. For decades Japan has been a huge net exporter and has consequently amassed hundreds of billions in foreign assets. But in August the country experienced another steep fall in exports, the 18th consecutive month of deficit (seasonally adjusted) following the earthquake and tsunami of last year. Japan’s phase-out of nuclear power and increasing reliance on imported natural gas and crude oil represent a structural shift in its trade flows. The source of Japan’s historic capital surplus from its trade sector is beginning to reverse.
While Japan is suffering from lower exports to the EU, it’s worth noting that China is Japan’s biggest trading partner. Any slowdown in Chinese growth will have a disproportionate impact on Japan’s economy. The ongoing dispute over the Senkaku islands (Japanese name) or the Diaoyu (China’s) will most likely amount to nothing as far as investors are concerned, but there’s always the chance that a miscalculation on either side could lead to something more serious. One might imagine that a dispute with its biggest trading partner would hurt the Yen, although historically Japanese investors have reacted to trouble at home by repatriating assets and driving the value of the Yen up, so this is a bit of a wild card.
More tangibly, growth differentials continue to favor the U.S., with Japan’s economy likely to experience only around 0.5% real GDP growth in 2013, down from 2% this year. Japan is also facing its own version of a fiscal cliff and last week the BOJ announced it would increase its version of QE from 70TN Yen to 80TN to offset the likely GDP headwinds from the legislature’s failure so far to pass a budget.
All these issues represent some optionality, in that they may be resolved without consequence but also create the potential for downward pressure on the Yen. Promoting a strong currency seems to be a quaint notion nowadays for developed countries, as the Fed, ECB and BOJ all engage in the “race to the bottom” in order to try to stimulate growth through stronger exports. Japan is as well equipped as any to weaken its currency.
Finally, the US$/Yen exchange rate hasn’t been that interesting lately. After running up to 83 and back during the Summer it’s been directionless and is not far above the lowest levels in many years. A 5% drop in the US$/Yen exchange rate from here would be substantial, and doesn’t seem that likely. It may do nothing but there are plenty of catalysts that could drive the exchange rate higher (i.e. weaker Yen) and the longer term outlook for the currency is negative.
We are long the ProShares Ultra Short Yen (YCS) as a way to express this view.
https://sl-advisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/logo1.jpg00Simon Lackhttps://sl-advisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/logo1.jpgSimon Lack2012-09-24 11:28:272012-09-24 11:28:27The Optionality in Shorting the Yen
There’s a thoughtful op-ed by Gavyn Davies in the FT today (Why did Bernanke change his mind). The Fed has a dual mandate of targetting maximum employment consistent with stable prices (which they take to mean inflation no greater than 2%). What’s become clear following last week’s announcement is that the priority the Fed attaches to each of these goals is likely to subtly shift in favor of tolerating higher inflation in the interests of achieving greater employment. Bernanke himself went to great pains to argue that no such change was contemplated, and traditionally Fed chairman have always argued that low inflation is the best way to support job growth.
But the Fed has little choice but to shift its emphasis, if for no other reason than one of its two mandates has been missing its target for several years now. Bernanke talked about skills atrophying as the long term unemployed become unemployable, and therefore move from cyclically unemployed to structurally so (a miserably dry way to describe a sad loss of many people’s ability to earn a decent living). Republicans have jumped all over this as being pro-Obama politics, which it is although almost certainly that’s coincidental. The Fed would be far too aware of the political season to do anything overtly political and risk being seen as less than independent.
The politics though are for others to contemplate. What does seem plain is that an open-ended and potentially long-lived QE 3 is probably negative for the US$ – especially so now that the ECB has enough firepower to support bond markets far longer than speculators can bet on a crisis. It’s probably positive for equities, although here it’s important to own names you’d like regardless of the near term direction of the economy. And the Fiscal Cliff isn’t receiving the attention it most likely will after the election when the focus shifts to whether Congress will avert a 2013 recession or not.
Our biggest position remains the gold miners ETF (GDX) which we like both because many miners are cheap to NAV but also for the QE 3 reasons described above. Both the Fed and the ECB are focused on reflation as their number one goal. Fiscal policy is likely to be at least modestly restrictive, but it seems that we’ll get QE (4,5…57) until employment improves. The Fed’s response to weaker growth is quite plain. When eventually growth does pick up expect those familiar “Fed behind the curve” headlines to last longer than usual. In fact, the most bearish case for gold is if the Fed fails. It’s not an attractive outcome to contemplate, and not one that’s likely in our opinion. So we like GDX as the most efficient way to align ourselves with government policy.
We also continue to own Corrections Corp (CXW) while we wait for further developments as the company finally decides to convert to partial REIT status, a change likely in early 2013.
Most recently we invested in Energizer Holdings Inc. (ENR) which, at under 11 times next year’s earnings and with strong market share in both batteries and razors is attractively priced. The stock has been weak recently, and there are some questions about the long term outlook for disposable batteries. But management is still guiding to $6-6.20 per share for FY 2012 earnings (their fiscal year ends this month). They also continue to buy back stock, having repurchase $268 million in FY 2011 and $211 million in the first 9 months of FY 2012 through June. It’s likely they’ll dedicate substantial portions of their free cashflow to buying stock over the next couple of years, and so we’ve been accumulating a small position at current levels.
https://sl-advisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/logo1.jpg00Simon Lackhttps://sl-advisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/logo1.jpgSimon Lack2012-09-17 14:34:402012-09-17 14:34:40Bernanke Makes the Case for Gold
One of the few things on which just about everybody can agree during this election season is that our elected officials in Washington, DC have taken on too much debt on our behalf. Voters part company on what to do about it, but most agree it’s a problem that’s not going away. Deciding to borrow money at the government level is so easy; rates are extremely low and the pain of repayment is left to someone else. I just finished reading Roger Lowenstein’s excellent 2009 book, While America Aged: How Pension Debts Ruined General Motors, Stopped the NYC Subways, Bankrupted San Diego, and Loom as the Next Financial Crisis. It provides a sobering portrayal of how many seemingly expedient decisions can in aggregate lead to catastrophe.
I live in Westfield, New Jersey, a town of around 30,000 people, easy commuting distance west of New York City. We are currently facing our own debt choice. It’s not an existential issue, but it illustrates at a grass roots level how the ethos of consumption today creates problems for tomorrow. Westfielders are about to vote on a $16.9 million bond, the proceeds of which will be used to finance two separate projects: 1) roof repairs on a number of school buildings, and 2) installing a lighted turf field (we already have two).
No doubt few Westfielders have any clear concept of what this new indebtedness means to them personally. The numbers governments at all levels spend are often abstract at an individual level. But a clear perspective can be gained by comparing this amount with the $24 million annual property tax revenue collected by Westfield. The proposal is therefore to borrow an amount equal to two thirds of our property taxes. Every property owner will consequently owe an amount equal to this proportion of their annual property tax bill, and in strict financial terms the equity in their home will be reduced by the amount of this obligation. If the money is invested such that Westfield is $17 million more attractive as a place to live, the difference may be made up. But I wonder how many people would willingly vote for this additional personal debt obligation versus those who might approve a somewhat abstract $17 million collective borrowing. It’s just so easy to vote to approve such things if they’re not translated into personal terms. This is how as a country we’ve arrived at a point awash in debt. Roger Lowenstein told his story well, as he always does.
The vote is on September 24th. I shall vote no. We shall see, on a micro basis, whether the fiscal standards we wish our elected officials in Washington DC would follow are the same standards we apply at a local level.
https://sl-advisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/logo1.jpg00Simon Lackhttps://sl-advisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/logo1.jpgSimon Lack2012-09-14 08:50:022012-09-14 08:50:02A Grass Roots View of the Narcotic Effect of Debt
It might strike some a hyperbole to accuse the government of stealing taxpayers money – up there with the conspiracy theories around JFK’s assassination or the staging of the Apollo 11 moon landing in a warehouse in Hollywood. But it’s just the sorry Math confronting savers, most recently highlighted in a CNBC article yesterday. Conventionally, lowering the cost of borrowing should be stimulative for economic activity, but it’s a zero sum game and savers including many retirees are in effect funding this stimulus through negative real returns on their savings. The yields on TIPS (Treasury Inflation Protected Securities) show this quite starkly – 5 year TIPS have a negative yield of 1.47%. What’s even worse for taxable investors is that the income they receive (equal to the CPI) is immediately taxable whereas the negative interest rate isn’t recognizable as a loss until maturity. TIPS don’t belong in taxable accounts. And of course, the biggest borrower nowadays is the Federal government, so they’re benefitting from setting their own ultra-low borrowing cost.
I’ve been surprised at how little public outcry there has been from savers reacting to this stealth transfer of part of their wealth to borrowers (who of course benefit from ultra-low rates). I doubt that’s about to change, but at least the issue is gaining some attention.
Over the past few days a few not very surprising things have happened. From Der Spiegel (as reported in the FT) German Chancellor Merkel has concluded that Greece must stay in the Euro and is now focused on ensuring this happens. Although many people (including apparently a majority of German voters) believe Greece should be kicked out (a satisfying and totally justified result of their profligacy) policymakers no doubt recognize that shoring up Spain and Italy (whose bond markets would undoubtedly be under enormous pressure in the event of a “Grexit”) would require sums beyond their current resources (perhaps 1 Trillion Euros). There really is no other choice.
Meanwhile the ECB announced its own version of QE last week over the objections of the Bundesbank. And another month of weak U.S. employment data on Friday made QE3 ever more likely. So Greece is staying in, and government buying of bonds is being broadened. None of this was much of a surprise, but equities have been rallying nevertheless, driven in part by the ever-decreasing attractiveness of fixed income. Mitt Romney even noted on Meet the Press yesterday that equities were higher because where else can you earn a decent return.
Interestingly though, GDP forecasts are not being revised higher. JPMorgan for example notes that consensus forecasts for GDP continue to be subject to modest downward revisions, and many corporations reporting earnings in recent weeks have provided cautious guidance on the near term outlook. It’s also interesting to note the divergence between stable, dividend yielding stocks and the S&P 500. On Friday they actually moved in opposite directions – the iShares Dow Jones Select Dividend Index (DVY) was -0.3% while the S&P 500 was +0.40%. In aggregate this all looks rather as if active equity managers are scrambling to keep up with their benchmarks while the market’s rising – higher beta names are performing well and the market is climbing its wall of worry.
For our part, our largest overall exposure in Deep Value Equities remains the Gold Miners ETF (GDX) since real assets have central bank support through reflation if they fail to improve through stronger economic activity. Our next largest is Corrections Corp (CXW) as we await further developments on their conversion to a REIT. Hedged Dividend Capture has lost around 2% over the past few weeks consistent with its proclivity to underperform a strong equity market. MLPs remain attractive – it’s interesting to note the growing number of unconventional MLP IPOs in recent weeks. A number of private equity firms have been taking public as MLPs businesses that have far more volatile earnings than is normal for the sector. An example is Petrologistics lp (PDH), whose S-1 registration statement includes the warning that, “We may not have sufficient cash available to pay any quarterly distribution on our common units.” Their units offer an 8% distribution yield but that yield could move violently in response to the profitability of polypropylene production rom their single facility. It’s not a name we would own, but developments such as these may begin to alter the make-up of the Alerian MLP Index.
https://sl-advisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/logo1.jpg00Simon Lackhttps://sl-advisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/logo1.jpgSimon Lack2012-09-10 10:11:202012-09-10 10:11:20No Surprises Except the Rally
Sell in May and Go Away is an easily remembered rule that worked very well for the past two years. Last year from April 30 to August 31, the S&P 500 lost 11%. Over more than fifty years it’s been sound advice 47% of the time so slightly less effective than a coin flip. However, when it works the results can be memorable, and some spectacular falls in stocks have occurred during this time period including 1966 (-15%), 1974 (-20%), 2002 (-15%) and 2010 (-12%). Recent years have reinforced the rule, with eight out of twelve Summers this millennium representing an unwelcome vacation distraction. Many a holiday has been ruined by portfolio losses on top of that expensive beach house, and no doubt those painful memories persist. However, during the 80s and 90s it worked in only seven years out of 20. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the overall market direction plays a big role. Two thirds of the time Sell in May worked was when the market’s return for the year was negative. So if you’re skilled at selecting good years to be in stocks, you can make your Summers a bit more enjoyable. And for those who want a little bit of an edge, Sell in May followed the pattern set in the first four months of the year 61% of the time. A bad start for the year is a little more likely to continue a few months longer.
In total though, following the Sell in May adage since 1960 would have “cost” an investor on average 0.5% p.a. — more after commissions and taxes are included. Interestingly, most of the 6.3% compounded annual return over this entire period was generated while school was open. As it turns out the Summer that’s about to end ranks #26 with a 1% return, close to the average. This is a seasonal pattern that’s worth following, but barely. However, while Sell in May is not a profitable strategy, for some investors the foregone return by being out of the market may seem a price worth paying for a quiet vacation.
Although macro issues continue to hang over the market and rising prices were caused in part by the calamities that did not befall (i.e. southern Europe still uses Euros), it is notable how many companies reporting earnings during the Summer revised down earnings guidance and generally expressed caution. Even the most economically insensitive companies tempered outlooks. Examples include McDonalds (MCD) who, citing macro headwinds, reported no increase in monthly global comps in July – the worst since April 2003. Coke (KO) experienced declining volumes of 4% in Europe during the second quarter. IBM saw revenues contract globally and profit growth for many companies is relying on improved operating margins rather than top line growth. While it’s never easy to assess whether macro concerns are fully reflected in market prices (or indeed overly reflected) the more cautious outlook recently being provided at the individual company level is noteworthy.
The “fiscal cliff” is also a perplexing hurdle that isn’t yet receiving the respect it deserves. One major investment bank has in its quarterly GDP forecast a fairly smooth sequence of figures from 3Q12 to 1Q13 (+1.5%, +2.0%, +1.5%) that seem to defy common sense. While Washington is consumed with an election countless organizations big and small are planning 2013 capital expenditures and hiring without knowing whether we’ll have a Made in DC recession on January 1st. Anecdotally, many companies are already delaying major commitments until they have greater visibility into 2013 economic activity.
Conventional wisdom is that the lame-duck Congress will amiably defer the mandated tax hikes and spending cuts to later in 2013 and the new Congress, whereas many of us recall that this is the same group of legislators who brought America to the verge of “technical” default during the debt ceiling brinkmanship last Summer (when Sell in May worked). Sometime shortly after the election when the celebrations and recriminations are still fresh, one deeply unhappy party will be expected to compromise with another victorious one. While things will probably work out (because they usually do) a crisis-free experience seems unlikely. The Congressional calendar provides just sixteen days when the House will be in session between Election Day and December 14th when they recess. There seems plenty of room for a miscalculation.
Meanwhile stable, dividend paying stocks are by many measures relatively expensive (most recently highlighted in Barron’s on August 24th). It’s not surprising that low interest rates and widespread global uncertainty have made, say, Kraft (KFT) appealing, because demand for Oreo cookies and cheese is more predictable than Chinese demand for iron ore or the ability of large banks to both reinvent their business models and avoid endless debilitating investigations and fines. To borrow from Michael Lewis in Liar’s Poker, an investor in Goldman Sachs must ask where will the firm find their next “Herman the German” (AKA gullible buyer of hard to understand securities).
One interesting lesson in the field of Behavioral Finance is that many investors apply unreasonably narrow ranges to their forecasts of outcomes. In other words, most of us have a tendency to be over-confident that we are right about our investment decisions. Which is why, in spite of the preceding cautious market narrative we are not heavily invested in cash at present. As coherent as this letter might (hopefully) appear, it could also be dead wrong, and the longer the investment horizon the more likely the outcome is to be good. However while we haven’t sold everything, we have over the past couple of months shifted in our Deep Value Equity strategy away from cyclical exposure and towards companies whose risk is substantially idiosyncratic. Will Corrections Corp (CXW) convert to a REIT, which should cause a meaningful increase in valuation? Will JCPenney (JCP) carry out a successful transformation? Will AIG continue to buy back the government’s shares in it at half of book value? Will Warren Buffett repurchase shares in Berkshire (BRK-B) if they fall to within 10% of book value? Will Burger King (BKW) and Family Dollar (FDO) improve their operating metrics towards those of their peers? All of these are holdings in our Deep Value Equity strategy, along with cash and gold miners (GDX) to protect against deflation and reflation respectively.
Our Hedged Dividend Capture Strategy is very low turnover by design and so retains its positions in stable, low beta dividend paying stocks such as MCD, KO, KFT and others mentioned above. We believe the combination of these long positions with a short S&P500 hedge results in a portfolio uncorrelated with equities. Performance for the year in this strategy is flat, since the +13% return in the S&P500 has generally favored higher beta names with low or no dividend. Interestingly, without Apple (AAPL) the S&P500 would be up 2.2% less than it is so far this year, 16% of its return. Just being short AAPL has reduced performance in this strategy by a little over 1%. It’s an amazing outcome considering AAPL began the year with a 3% weighting in the S&P 500 (it’s now over 4%). We’re not even negative on AAPL, we’re simply short it through its inclusion in the S&P 500.
Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs) continue to look attractive with 6%+ yields and solid growth prospects. Developing new energy infrastructure to support the growing domestic production of oil and natural gas will remain a vital element of energy independence for many years to come. The likelihood of low bond yields for the foreseeable future combined with the inflation protection such assets afford through their ability to raise prices annually make this a useful income-generating investment for many investors. In August we reduced our position in Sunoco Logistics Partners (SXL) in those accounts where this long-held position had become an overweight through strong performance and reallocated towards Oneok Partners (OKS).
All of which goes to show that, had we embraced Sell in May for many sound reasons at the beginning of the Summer we would have been dead wrong then too.
https://sl-advisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/logo1.jpg00Simon Lackhttps://sl-advisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/logo1.jpgSimon Lack2012-09-05 11:20:232012-09-05 11:20:23Don’t Go Away in May
Only 25% of Germans think Greece should remain in the Euro or receive further additional EU support, according to a Financial Times/Harris poll. Holding opinions unburdened by the need to implement them is an indulgence afforded voters in all democracies. It feels good to punish the tax-dodging Greeks by kicking them out. But if instead these same German voters were asked if they’d contribute perhaps 300BN Euros towards the probably 1 Trillion that would be requires to support Italy and Spain if Greece leaves the Euro, they would probably reject that as well. This is the unpalatable reality no doubt well understood by Germany’s decision makers. In any case, public opinion was against giving up the Deutsche Mark in favor of the Euro as well, but opinion polls don’t necessarily drive political decision making in Germany. For Europe’s biggest economy, keeping Greece in the Euro is unfortunately probably cheaper than kicking them out.
Greece may wind up leaving, but if that turns out to be the best of available options then the future for EU growth will be pretty bleak.
https://sl-advisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/logo1.jpg00Simon Lackhttps://sl-advisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/logo1.jpgSimon Lack2012-09-03 15:43:042012-09-03 15:43:04Kicking Greece Out Ain't That Easy
Towards the end of last year we felt there was an interesting opportunity to be long equities hedged with a short position in the Euro. Our thinking was that equities were attractively priced as long as a crisis was averted, and most of the bad things we could imagine would either begin in Europe (i.e. Euro collapse) or affect it more than the U.S. (such as an Israeli strike on Iran given the EU’s greater reliance of Middle East imports than the U.S.). We employed this bias in Fixed Income where long positions in bank debt were combined with short Euro positions.
That trade is no longer interesting, because a short Euro is a less effective hedge now that it’s weakened. But a similar concept exists with gold miners and equities.
Gold and Silver miners have for many months been trading at a healthy discount to the NAV of their reserves. Although the optionality provided by a long position in a miner should be worth something (since a rising gold price ought to create a disproportionate increase in the stock through operating leverage while if gold falls to unprofitable levels they can simply stop digging) the market continues to price the sector at a discount. One obvious move is to buy the Gold Miners ETF (GDX) and short gold itself (GLD). However, this means simply betting on a reversion to the mean of the relationship, and there’s no knowing when that might happen.
Instead, long GDX and short S&P 500 is an interesting trade. Gold is out of favor and a short position isn’t likely to provide much protection from here. If gold does sink, along with GDX, it’s likely to be in response to slower growth so the short equity hedge should provide some protection. But in that scenario the odds of QE increase, so reflation ought to provide some support for the yellow metal. Conversely, if the world avoids all the various disasters that may afflict it, rising markets are likely to lift commodities with them, and the weaker US$ that would result in that scenario would also provide support for GDX.
The correct hedge ratio is less than 1:1 – we prefer something closer to $1 of GDX versus short $0.75 of SPY. And the correlation between GDX and SPY is not as strong at with GLD, but we think this combinaton of exposures makes more sense. In the long run (i.e. years) we don’t think gold will perform as well as equities. Warren Buffett and others have articulated most eloquently the problems with an asset that does nothing, pays no dividend and costs money to store. But we’re entering a period where developed world central banks will be redoubling their efforts at reflating, with the ECB likely to adopt their own form of QE in the next several weeks. Long GDX allows one to invest in mining stocks at a current discount to their reserves without direct exposure to the relationship continuing to deteriorate. This is why we are currently invested in GDX in our Deep Value Equity Strategy, since we think it offers an attractive risk/return profile compared with the broader equity markets.
The chart below shows the last two years of a position long GDX/short 75% SPY, and also the S&P500 itself, both rebased to 100 on August 2, 2010.
Disclosure: Author is Long GDX
https://sl-advisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/logo1.jpg00Simon Lackhttps://sl-advisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/logo1.jpgSimon Lack2012-08-31 10:55:002012-08-31 10:55:00Why Gold Miners Can Outperform the S&P500
Interesting piece from NY Fed on negative interest rates and the possible behavioral changes they would cause. If banks were charged for leaving deposits with the Fed, they would in turn charge customers for holding balances. It could cause all kinds of odd outcomes; naturally individuals would hold much more cash, but for corporations and institutions that wouldn’t be feasible. It could cause bills to be paid early, or where the recipient is highly creditworthy paid in advance. Many more certified checks could wind up being issued – you could issue one to yourself to avoid bank charges on the deposited cash. And special purpose banks might spring up who would hold deposits in the form of cash in a vault (as opposed to make loans).
It all illustrates the difficulties presented by deflation, which is why we can expect the Fed to use all means available to avoid such a situation.
I hadn’t got involved in the recent flotation of Manchester United (MANU), perhaps Britain’s best-known brand of (English) football club. Not just because I’m an Arsenal fan either, but because investments in sports franchises can often be a case of heart ruling head and the Glazers (current owners) were unlikely to be selling cheap.
But this morning I came across this wonderful article that shows MANU’s IPO foisted on hapless retail investors was “Facebookian” in its cavalier attitude towards earning a return for new owners. IPO buyers have virtually no voting control, little prospect of a near-term dividend and proudly possess shares trading at 106 times earnings, a level Mark Zuckerberg even failed to emulate. And MANU describes itself as an “emerging growth company” (in order to qualify for more lenient disclosure requirements), a scarcely credible notion for anyone who grew up watching them in the 70s or earlier.
As long as deals like MANU’s IPO can get done it shows that not everybody’s hunkered down waiting for one of the many looming disasters (Euro/Fiscal Cliff/Israel-Iran/China Crash) to hit.
https://sl-advisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/logo1.jpg00Simon Lackhttps://sl-advisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/logo1.jpgSimon Lack2012-08-28 08:18:592012-08-28 08:18:59MANU makes FB Look Cheap
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By clicking the OK button below, you will be connected to a website maintained by a third party. We are providing a link to the third party’s website solely as a convenience to you, because we believe that website may provide useful content. We do not control the content on the third-party website; we do not guarantee any claims made on it; nor do we endorse the website, its sponsor, or any of the content, policies, activities, products or services offered on the website or by any advertiser on the site. We disclaim any responsibility for the website’s performance or interaction with your computer, its security and privacy policies and practices, and any consequences that may result from visiting it. The link is not intended to create an offer to sell, recommend, or a solicitation of an offer to buy or hold, any securities.
By clicking the OK button below, you will be connected to a website maintained by a third party. We are providing a link to the third party’s website solely as a convenience to you, because we believe that website may provide useful content. We do not control the content on the third-party website; we do not guarantee any claims made on it; nor do we endorse the website, its sponsor, or any of the content, policies, activities, products or services offered on the website or by any advertiser on the site. We disclaim any responsibility for the website’s performance or interaction with your computer, its security and privacy policies and practices, and any consequences that may result from visiting it. The link is not intended to create an offer to sell, recommend, or a solicitation of an offer to buy or hold, any securities.
By clicking the OK button below, you will be connected to a website maintained by a third party. We are providing a link to the third party’s website solely as a convenience to you, because we believe that website may provide useful content. We do not control the content on the third-party website; we do not guarantee any claims made on it; nor do we endorse the website, its sponsor, or any of the content, policies, activities, products or services offered on the website or by any advertiser on the site. We disclaim any responsibility for the website’s performance or interaction with your computer, its security and privacy policies and practices, and any consequences that may result from visiting it. The link is not intended to create an offer to sell, recommend, or a solicitation of an offer to buy or hold, any securities.
