Barron’s has a couple of interesting articles this weekend. They lead with “Buckle Up”, and make the case for equities by highlighting the very wide equity risk premium (the S&P500 earnings yield of 8% minus the yield on ten-year treasuries of 2%) something we’ve also noted in the past. This spread is historically wide and, it can be argued, makes a compelling case for stocks. What seems more clear is that the spread will narrow but that could just as easily be through bond yields rising. We do think equities represent an attractive long-term investment but we are more sure that bonds do not. Public policy in the U.S. is to effect a transfer of real wealth from savers to borrowers, so while stocks look attractive bonds look positively ugly.

Of course noting that bond yields are low and can only really move up is scarcely a contrarian view. Randall Forsyth notes in Barron’s a solid agreement among forecasters that bond yields will be higher a year from now. While it makes a great deal of sense, presumably the Federal Reserve will respond to higher yields by increasing its purchases unless rising yields are accompanied by an upside surprise in GDP growth. They’re likely to maintain negative real rates of return for a considerable time.

A hedge fund, QB Asset Management, forecasts “face-ripping inflation”, a term likely to catch your attention. The output gap (such as the difference between current unemployment and the natural rate) seems too high for that – there still appears to be plenty of excess capacity in the labor force. It’s hard to see how inflation (at least as measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics) can take off when so many people are available to be employed. QB could be right, but it hasn’t happened so far and without an increase in money velocity the jump in money supply isn’t likely to become inflationary. But similar to the wide equity risk premium, while low current inflation may persist it’s not worth betting on a continuation of the status quo.

Shorting Euros is another crowded trade. It’s just hard to see how any of the solutions on offer will promote growth within the region. The Real GDP differential is likely to be 2.5% next year in favor of the U.S. European governments are following pro-cyclical policies during a time of slowing growth. The Euro has weakened in recent weeks but really ought to be far lower. However, we run this risk in our hedge fund in combination with long equities from a number of different trades. We think the Euro will depreciate, but if we’re wrong it’ll most likely be in a scenario that is good for stocks. Borrowing Euros to buy U.S. equities represents an attractive  opportunity. Mike Platt, co-founder of BlueCrest, a global macro hedge fund, offered a most dire outlook on Europe and its banks. BlueCrest is one of the most successful hedge funds around, and the TV interview is worth a look. Platt is frustratingly vague about how he’s positioning for what he expects will be a continued deterioration but leaves little doubt about his overall view. If European banks valued their positions the way hedge funds have to they’d all be declared insolvent. I can’t really see why anyone would lend anybody in Europe any money, except perhaps in Germany and the UK.

Finally, I’d note that JPMorgan issued revised valuation estimates for large cap E&P names. Devon Energy (DVN) remains one of the  largest positions in our Deep Value Equity Strategy, trading at close to the value of its proved reserves. The continued shift from natural gas to oil production in the U.S. in response to relative pricing should work to Devon’s advantage given its asset mix.

Disclosure: Author in Long SPY, EUO, DVN

As the reality sets in of guiding 26 countries (i.e. the EU less Britain) towards agreement on a common set of revisions to the Treaty, the smug satisfaction of the tabloid press and at least a substantial minority of the British population is almost palpable even here on the U.S. side of the Atlantic. One by one, other member nations are commenting on the challenges of not only finding agreement but then achieving ratification through 26 parliamentary processes. The FT has a good synopsis of the growing acknowledgment of challenges ahead. The UK has to avoid any overtly self-congratulatory behavior, but the truth is that for those afforded the luxury of expressing opinions unburdened by the reins of government, seeing any project related to the French founder is never dull. And there’s many decades of suspicion of German power, even though the competition nowadays is thankfully economic and on the football pitch. I must confess I share many of these sentiments myself.

Michael Cembalest, CIO of JPMorgan’s Private Bank and an eloquent, insightful observer, put it well in a recent newsletter. Likening the ongoing Euro debt crisis to Bergman’s “Scenes from a Marriage”, Cembalest observed that, “Holding assets of countries suffocating themselves is not something that sounds very rewarding, unless prices get extremely cheap.” That’s the point. The prescription of austerity may be the right solution, but the widening differential in Real GDP growth between the U.S. and the Euro zone (2.5-3% in 2012) is scarcely likely to make Euro zone assets attractive. The € is becoming a funding currency – a currency with reliably low interest rates for the creditworthy (or those with good collateral). Borrowing in € and investing in U.S. assets – even risky assets like U.S. equities – has been the right position in recent weeks and events are unfolding in a way that’s likely to continue current trends. It’s hard to see why the € should rally much other than on the back of short-covering – and if it does, equities will surely move up as well.  As a result, we continue to be long U.S. equities. We like Microsoft (MSFT) in our Deep Value Equities Strategy, at 7X earnings after adjusting for cash on balance sheet. You’re unlikely to wake up worrying about their future, although there is always the risk of an over-priced acquisition with all that cash sitting around. And we are still short € through owning EUO.

Several weeks ago we switched our investment in Range Resources (RRC) into Devon Energy (DVN). We had liked RRC for a long time, but it had been looking less like a value stock as its price eventually doubled in a year. Shale drilling for natural gas is an area to which we’ve had some exposure for almost two years. Natural gas is likely to represent an increasing share of the means of power generation in the U.S. It is (1) far cheaper than crude oil on a BTU equivalent basis, (2) cleaner than other fossil fuels, and (3) here in the U.S., as opposed to having to be shipped through the Straits of Hormuz past Iran. RRC represents a concentrated bet on the Marcellus Shale, an enormous area that stretches from New York State to Tennessee. RRC strikes us as a well-run company, and we like the management. However, challenges to the shale gas story seem to be multiplying. In August, the EIA sharply reduced its estimate of the Estimated Ultimately Recoverable (EUR) amounts of shale gas in the Marcellus, causing a huge difference between the aggregate potential reserves from all the companies drilling there and the EIA’s estimate.

Recently the New York Times highlighted growing concern about the legality surrounding the transfer of certain drilling leases in Pennsylvania. Fracking, the technique by which drillers pump fluids (mostly water) into deep rock formations, imposing stress on rock formations that then frees up trapped natural gas, continues to be the target of environmental criticism. It has long been blamed for contaminating local drinking water (a movie “Gasland” was made to focus on this) and there have also been questions about how the fracking fluids (which are almost all water but do contain tiny amounts of very nasty chemicals) are disposed of. Just the other day the EPA blamed fracking fluids as the likely source of water contamination in Wyoming. And there’s even suggestions that fracking and the disposal of fluids deep under ground can cause minor earthquakes. Added together, there’s a growing source of potential problems for shale gas. Tighter environmental regulations around drilling would be fine – natural gas prices are so cheap that increased production costs across the industry would simply reduce some of the price advantage, so there shouldn’t be much problem with that. But the risk remains of some environmental disaster requiring expensive remediation. Not the most likely outcome, but a concern nonetheless.

As a result, in Energy our biggest holding is Devon Energy (DVN), which while focused on natural gas has a significant exposure to liquids and crude oil as well. They are all domestic and trade at around the value of their proved reserves (i.e. unproved and possible are thrown in for nothing). We switched our RRC holding into DVN some 2-3 months ago, and while we could have chosen better timing it’s currently looking like a good move.  We also own Comstock Resources (CRK), whose recent acquisition in West Texas was greeted positively by the market since it’s in an area where the company is already active with continued success. And most speculatively, we own McMoran Exploration (MMR), which has nothing to do with shale gas but which is pursuing shallow water deep drilling for natural gas in the Gulf of Mexico. Results from their Davy Jones flow test will be available soon and the stock will no doubt move sharply in one direction or another. The stock trades with a high beta which is not that meaningful since its ultimate value is a binary outcome based on the abovementioned flow test.

Disclosure: Author is Long MSFT, DVN, CRK, MMR, EUO

I spent a few days in London last week, meeting with investors and discussing my book. I also managed three separate TV appearances. I can tell you that if the € sovereign debt crisis appears to dominate the news in the U.S., it is an all-consuming obsession for the financial media in the UK. It is naturally more impactful on Britain, and the jingoistic response of the popular media to Prime Minister Cameron’s exercise of his veto over Treaty changes showed how shallow is the support in Britain for the European project. I’m sure if there was a way to shift Britain 1,500 miles to the west it would more accurately reflect the country’s center of gravity between European liberalism and U.S. mercantilism.

But wherever you sit, Friday’s EU summit was yet another all-too-small step towards finding solutions to the problems of too much European sovereign debt. The markets are now left to wait and see if the ECB will find enough to like in the commitments of the other 26 nations towards fiscal discipline so that it can become a significant buyer of high yielding sovereign debt. One has to assume they will do so if needed – sufficient private buyers are not yet there, although over the next 2-3 years the Carry Trade could become a source of recapitalization for European banks desperately in need of such. 7% Italian yields funded at 1% could replenish the retained equity of banks for a considerable time. It’s not a trade we would do ourselves, but it could plausibly draw substantial capital in the months ahead.

Indeed, the growing differential in Real GDP between the U.S. and the € zone looks set to be 2.5% in 2012 and could easily reach 3% if Europeans follow through on promised austerity while the U.S. delays such and extends the payroll tax deduction. The € is becoming a “funding currency”, the disrespectful moniker attached to a currency facing an extended period of low rates and little prospect of moving higher. Borrowing in € is looking increasingly like a cheap source of funding – after all, European sovereigns have been doing so for years with reckless abandon (hence the present crisis). The ECB is likely to keep rates low and in considering the solutions, whether they stay on the present course of  employing fiscal drag, utilize an increase in inflation or stumble into a disaster, it would seem that most plausible paths for the € are lower. It’s frankly part of the solution, to further stimulate exports and devalue the real value of debt owned by non-€ investors.

We think it’s one of the better trades available, but in combination with a long equities portfolio is becomes quite compelling. Stocks are reasonable long-term value and are compelling versus fixed income. A higher € would almost certainly be accompanied by higher equities and an altogether more friendly investment outlook. It’s not obvious how we’ll get there, but it’s certainly possible. The big issue restraining equities is the €. So borrow the € and buy US stocks.

As a result we remain invested in U.S. equities. Our biggest position is Kraft (KFT) an attractively priced name that provide exposure to global GDP in combination with their own positive story. KFT has seen almost 7% organic revenue growth through the first 9 months of 2011 and more than 5% of that has come from pricing, so they’re clearly able to push increases through the pipeline. They continue to enjoy operating margins of 12-14%. The Cadbury synergies are coming through, both in sales of Oreo cookies in India across Cadbury’s existing distribution infrastructure and through sales of Cadbury’s chocolate in South America where it had relatively small penetration. KFT’s break-up next year into a global snack business and U.S. grocery business should unlock additional value for investors, and at 14X next year’s consensus earnings with 11% YOY EPS growth we think valuation is not excessive.

We continue to like Aspen Insurance (AHL), trading at 60% of book value in an industry with reduced capacity given a series of reinsurance payouts over the past year (Japanese earthquake and so on).

We are long stocks such as these in our Deep Value Equity strategy, and in our hedge fund maintain long equities with a short € (long EUO).

Disclosure: Author is Long KFT, AHL, EUO

Betting against a crisis is almost always the right approach. If you invest without leverage, you’re afforded the luxury of waiting to see how events play out without caring too much about the path equity prices take. It might very well be that the latest round of negotiations will result in the ultimately more stable Euro the whole world now desires. While being long equities reflects a belief that things will work out, borrowing money to do so would reflect more conviction than is warranted. A big question is precisely what mechanism will be used to enforce budgetary discipline in the future, since the Maastricht Criteria (limits on deficits at 3% of GDP; debt at 60% of GDP) were as much use as the Maginot Line against the German panzers in 1940. In fact, Germany and France were among the first countries to violate this law, and consequently the fines (set at implausibly high levels such as 1% of a country’s GDP) were never imposed. It’s unclear how such fines could ever be imposed, and a key element supporting the imposition of fiscal discipline remains to be defined.

It occurred to me that one solution might be to limit each country’s banking exposure to profligate nations. Instead of emphasizing rules for the borrowers, impose rules on the lenders. Germany could pass a law preventing its own banks from incurring country risk to, say, Spain in excess of 5% of a bank’s tier one capital. All the current measures impose penalties on the debt addicts, but the dealers who provide the fix are part of the problem too. This would seem to be a solution well within the ability of each creditor country to impose unilaterally without requiring a treaty overhaul, and would also limit creditor nations’ exposure to rule-breaking profligacy in the south. It seems a simple measure, I’m not sure why it’s not part of the solution.

The Economist magazine noted on the weekend that Sweden (an EU but non-Euro member) has imposed 12% Tier 1 Capital to Risk Weighted Assets requirements on its own banking system. Overleveraged banks are no doubt a substantial part of the problem. Sweden has prospered outside the Euro zone (though its export-driven economy is expected to suffer next year given a likely Eurozone recession). More countries should follow the model of Sweden and adopt more realistic leverage rules in their banking systems.

Meanwhile, long $100 of SPY and long $40 of EUO provides exposure to attractively priced stocks in combination with a short € position since most disaster scenarios for the stock market start in Europe. The relationship between the two has tightened in recent weeks – Eurozone sovereign debt solutions promote austerity and are negative for growth; a melt-down clearly is; muddling through with neither of the above should be (in fact, has already been) positive for equities and only mildly bullish for the €.

Disclosure: Author is Long SPY, Long EUO

Contemplating the unthinkable long ago became a necessary tool for analyzing the euro sovereign debt crisis. Today’s failed Bund auction is another step on the road to Berlin. The 1.98% yield is hardly attractive, and one could quite understand investors avoiding such paltry returns for ten years under most circumstances. But the Euro’s uncertain future has done what miniature German interest rates have not, and that is cause a shortage of willing buyers. Only 65% of the offered bonds were desired by private investors, and as a result the Bundesbank became the unwilling holder of over €2.3BN of the €6BN auction. They apparently plan to sell these in the near future when markets are calmer. They probably will – but this episode represents another step towards the cliff with seemingly no clear plan of action from policymakers to turn away from the brink.

The € seemingly has no good options. The best prospect for the currency to strengthen is in the event of a surprising and dramatic plan to solve the crisis. No such event appears plausible, but regardless of that all the likely solutions are negative for the currency:

1) slower growth through the austerity of reduced government budgets

or

2) a compromise of the ECB’s single focus on inflation as it buys unlimited amounts of debt.

And there’s always the possibility of neither of these, which is most likely worse.

The relationship between the € and the S&P500 (SPY) has grown steadily tighter in recent months. The correlation of returns between the S&P500 and the € over the past year is 0.6, whereas over the past month it’s 0.84. The slope of the regression line has gone from 0.27 to 0.4, and the relative volatility has risen from 0.4 to 0.9. In layman’s terms, they’ve become more linked but in addition the € has become increasingly sensitive to moves in the S&P500. What this means is a growing asymmetry between a portfolio of long equities and the main transmission of potential losses, the €. The statistics and our assessment are that a peaceful resolution to the crisis should lead to higher equities and a (perhaps only temporarily),  stronger € whereas a disaster will cause a sharply lower € with weaker equities. There is some positive convexity to owning equities, which are generally attractive long term investments facing huge macro uncertainty, and being short the €. This is our position – long a selection of equities that will still be profitable companies in virtually any scenario  – names such as KFT, MSFT, BRK, and short € through owning EUO.

Disclosure: Author is long SPY, KFT, MSFT, BRK, EUO

Greece has been warned by the troika (EU, ECB, IMF) that personally signed pledges from key political leaders are required before the next tranche of the bailout is released. Greece apparently has enough cash to last 20 days. The threat is that failure to comply will result in Greece being allowed to default. Well, at least Greek CDS contracts should finally have some value. At this poker table, who really believes the troika holds a strong hand? Both sides continue to avoid their Lehman moment. At this stage, with no clear strategy to avoid contagion, forcing Greece into bankruptcy simply isn’t a credible threat. The troika will find a face-saving way to provide the needed funding.

The Super Committee has done nothing remotely super, and as a result leaders of both parties assert that the $1.2 TN in automated spending cuts will take effect in 2013 absent an earlier negotiated settlement. $1.2 TN, cut equally from Defence and Entitlements. Who really believes that will happen? Congress wrote the law and can re-write it. There are several paths resolving the U.S. fiscal deficit may follow, but automated cuts immediately following a general election is not credible.

It’s becoming harder to figure out who holds a strong hand on either of these issues. Investors with no leverage, invested in quality companies and with some available cash probably hold the best cards. For our part, we have been defensively upgrading quality and raising modest amounts of cash. Equities remain an attractive investment, but government paralysis on both sides of the Atlantic looms ever larger over the economic and investment landscape. In Fixed Income we continue to like senior loans and hold BHL and PPR. In Deep Value Equities we have modestly lowered our exposure to natural gas E&P names, although our largest position remains Devon Energy (DVN). We also increased our position in McMoran Exploration (MMR), who will report on their Dave Jones flow test by the end of the year at which point the company’s prospects should be much clearer. And we continue to be short the € by holding EUO.

Most of the government players at this poker table need stronger hands.

Disclosure: Author is Long PPR, BHL, DVN, MMR, EUO

Barron’s ran an interesting article on places to go for higher income than high-grade bonds. The writer pointed out quite accurately that ten-year treasury bonds do not provide sufficient income to preserve after-tax real purchasing power. The Federal government doesn’t believe its creditors should earn a real return, and has adopted a policy to prevent that. The thinking investor’s response is to look elsewhere and to keep more money in cash waiting for better opportunities.

Closed end funds, which Barron’s highlights in their article “How to Get Safe Annual Payouts of 7%”  can be interesting if they trade at a discount. However, much of the market is characterized by funds that pay distributions in excess of their earnings in order to maintain a high “distribution yield”, even though they are in part giving investors back their own money. Closed end funds are best owned if they’re mispriced, in combination with a hedge to neutralize the NAV movements. We have owned Boulder Total Return Fund (BTF) for some time. The fund has a substantial holding in Berkshire Hathaway (BRK), and its second biggest holding is Yum Brands (YUM). BTF doesn’t pay a distribution, an omission that has caused traditional closed end fund investors to shun the stock. Consequently, it trades at a 21% discount to NAV. The PM and affiliates own over a third of the shares. One day they may reinstate the distribution or engage is some other value-creating exercise. In the meantime, it represents attractively-priced exposure to BRK or can be hedged to focus on the discount narrowing.

Another area we like is Master Limited Parterships.  Six per cent tax-deferred distributions with a reasonable expectation of 4-5% distribution growth. MLPs have historically outperformed stocks, bonds and REITS but remain an under-invested asset class. K-1’s deter many potential investors. But MLPs, particularly the midstream firms that invest in pipelines, storage facilities and refineries have only modest exposure to energy prices and toll-based fee models that create earnings stability. We think of MLPs as a good substitute for high yield bonds. Historically similar levels of price volatility but more attractive return profile.

Many high-dividend stocks are attractive. In some cases large companies with stable earnings growth offer dividends higher than their own debt. Johnson & Johnson (JNJ) and Pepsi (PEP) are both examples, and are names that we own in our Hedged Dividend Capture Strategy, where a diversified portfolio of such names is combined with an equity market hedge seeking to profit from dividends with reduced market volatility.

The “Fracturing of Pennsylvania” was another in a series the New York Times has been running on shale gas and potential environmental damage from its extraction. We like natural gas E&P names – shale gas represents an enormous source of fuel for the U.S. in the years ahead. It’s far cheaper than oil on a BTU-equivalent basis and it’s here in the politically stable U.S. But it needs to be mined safely. The issue of toxins leaking into drinking water remains a vexing one. So far the science strongly suggests that the risks are extremely low. But the number of stories of undrinkable water and high levels of metals in residents bloodstream is growing. The evidence that fracking is to blame is inconclusive at best, but it’s not an issue to ignore for investors or the landowners who sell drilling rights to their land. Range Resources (RRC) appears to have reacted professionally, which doesn’t shock me at all having met the management. We continue to like the company but believe the stock is expensive. We prefer Devon Energy (DVN), which trades closer to the value of its proven reserves.

The news from Europe remains a poker game. We are short the € through owning EUO. Kyle Bass has a thought provoking perspective.

Disclosure: Aithor is Long BTF, BRK, JNJ, PEP, EUO, DVN

Kyle Bass, who runs a hedge fund called Hayman Capital Management in Texas,  is gaining notoriety as an investor with the foresight to anticipate today’s growing sovereign debt crisis. If eurozone governments ultimately write down their debt because the weight of supporting their banks becomes too great, Kyle Bass will go down as one of the earliest to recognize and position for that. His worldview is dire, and it’s apparently prompted him to take some strange precautions such as acquiring $1 million nickels (20 million coins) because their 6.8 cents value as scrap metal exceeds their monetary worth. I listened to an interview yesterday on BBC Radio HardTalk in which he defended his views. The UK media tends to take a more populist stance with regard to hedge fund managers. It’s now 14 years since George Soros’s bet against Sterling preceded their leaving the European Monetary Union and ultimately declining to join the €. How fortunate that decision looks today, but at the time UK tabloids blared that George Soros had “broken the Bank of England” and financiers have never been fully trusted in the UK ever since. So the BBC’s interviewer adopted a combative stance, for instance accusing Bass of causing the collapse in Greek bonds through his bets on credit default swaps. Her attempts to portray him as a manipulating hedge fund manager exploiting opportunities for no benefit but his own were deftly handled with facts and figures. Kyle Bass has a point of view worth considering.

I went back and reread Bass’s investor letter from February, “The Cognitive Dissonance of it All”. He reaches a similar conclusion to Jim Millstein in Tuesday’s FT, although he focuses more on government revenues, debt and interest expense. Japan, given its shrinking and aging population combined with high levels of debt could not afford to borrow at the levels of other AAA-rated nations (such as France) because their total interest expense would exceed their revenue. As Bass says, “The ZIRP trap snaps shut.” (ZIRP is Zero Interest Rate Policy, pretty much what we have in the U.S. currently). I know people have been betting on a disaster in Japanese bonds for literally twenty years, and it has so far been a disastrous bet. But it does increasingly look as if it still is just a matter of time before we reach the tipping point. After reading what Kyle Bass has to say it’s hard to feel comfortable owning long-term government bonds issued anywhere in the world.

While the troubles in the Euro-zone have clearly been a major source of uncertainty for U.S. equity investors, it’s beginning to appear as if negative consequences will be largely imposed on Europeans with manageable fallout elsewhere. No doubt there’s still plenty to worry about and this assessment could be wrong, but the economic data is starting to point that way. EU-zone GDP growth of 0.2% was meager but pretty much as expected – the FT’s headline announcing that “Germany and France drive eurozone growth” seemed at odds with the numbers. Europe doesn’t look as if anyone’s driving except towards a cliff. As a result. it’s increasingly looking as if U.S. and Euro-zone growth will diverge significantly with the tail risk being for an even greater difference. Base Case forecasts from JPMorgan are for 2012 real GDP growth of 1.7% in the U.S. versus -0.6% in the Euro-zone. This is why there’s still a case to be short the €. Even without a financial disaster, plausible baseline assumptions favor the U.S. economy over Europe’s. But before you conclude that all the unthinkable outcomes have already been contemplated, read the op-Ed in the FT by Jim Millstein, chairman of Millstein & Co. Mr. Millstein argues that Europe’s banks are beyond too big to fail – they’re too big to save. The size of Europe’s biggest banks relative to their economies is disproportionate and far larger than in the U.S. If his warning of wholesale sovereign debt writedowns and bank recapitalizations comes true, new sources of private capital will be needed beyond whatever the IMF can supply. It’s a sobering scenario.

At least savers in Italy, Spain and even France are being offered a positive real return on ten year government bonds (nominal yields of 7%, 6.3% and 3.6% respectively). Given the sorry state of developed country finances every where including the U.S., it’s hard to see why anybody would lend to anyone for ten years at low single digit yields. 2% in the U.S. is derisory, and every day the Federal Reserve drives thinking fixed income investors away – to senior loans (we continue to own BHL and PPR) and to MLPs . In fact the 1 year return through October on the Alerian MLP Index AMZ is +7& compared with just 1.1% % for the S&P500 and 2.3% for REITS. MLPs are best accessed through individual holdings in order to fully benefit from the 6% tax-deferred yields available.

Dividend paying stocks remain a valid alternative. Ten year treasuries represent such poor value that only $20 in dividend paying stocks can generate the same after-tax return as $100 in treasuries (assuming 4% annual dividend growth).  A barbell, made up of cash invested in treasury bills and dividend paying stocks, is a valid alternative to today’s overpriced high grade bond market.

60 Minutes ran a piece last night revealing that Congressmen are not only exempt from the insider trading laws that apply to everyone else but also routinely exploit inside information to which they have access. That’s right, members of Congress can and frequently do profit from inside information, and it’s perfectly legal. Further description hardly seems necessary – you just have to believe that the leadership will be sufficiently embarrassed by the report that they’ll correct this glaring abuse swiftly.